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JEROLD H. ISRAEL

ELFBRANDT V. RUSSELL: THE
DEMISE OF THE OATH?

In Elf brandt v. Russell,1 the Supreme Court, in a 5-to-4 decision,
declared unconstitutional Arizona's requirement of a loyalty oath
from state employees. At first glance, Elfbrtmdt appears to be just
another decision voiding a state loyalty oath on limited grounds
relating to the specific language of the particular oath.2 Yet, several
aspects of Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion for the majority suggest
that Elfbrandt is really of far greater significance: 8 it may sharply
Jerold H. Israel is Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1

384 U.S. 11 (1966).

Immediate reaction generally placed the case in this category. The New YO'l'k
Times, for example, made the following comments in describing Elfbrandt: "The
decision avoided sweeping terms that might also have invalidated loyalty oaths of
other states. But it continued the high court's recent tendency to resolve all constitutional doubts against loyalty oath laws.•.•
"In the early nineteen-fifties the Supreme Court upheld loyalty oaths relating to
Los Angeles city employees, teachers in New York State, and candidates for public
office in Maryland. But in recent years without overruling the principle that public
employees can be required to sign such oaths, it has struck down several, finding
that they were improperly drafted." N.Y. Times, April 19, 1966, p. 1, col. 6; p. 1,
col. 4. See also Chicago Tribune, April 19, 1966, p. 3, cols. 1-3; NEWSWEEK 21 (May
2, 1966).
2

3 Even if the Elfbrandt ruling were limited to the particular language of the
Arizona statute, it would still have a significant impact on the laws of several states
since the Arizona provision is based on Maryland's widely copied "Ober Act." See
Mo. ANN. CooE, art. 85a, §§ 1, 10, 11 (1965 Supp.}; FLA. REV, STAT., tit. 44, ch. 876,
§§ 22, 24, 25 (1965 Supp.}; Miss. CooE ANN., tit. 17, ch. 10, §§ 4-064-01, 4064-02, 406403 (1964 Supp.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN., ch. 588, §§ I, 9 (1965 Supp.); OKLA. STAT.
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limit the scope and coverage of loyalty oaths generally and, indeed, may presage a ruling invalidating all such oaths. Of course,
only the Supreme Court can determine this. In the meantime, some
evaluation by others seems appropriate, particularly in light of
the numerous attacks against loyalty oaths currently being mounted
in various state courts and legislatures. 4

I.

THE ELFBRANDT OPINIONS

A. THE BACKGROUND

In form, if not in substance, the Arizona loyalty oath considered
in Elfbrandt was unusual. For its language contained none of the
negative disclaimers of affiliation or advocacy that mark the test
oath.5 The employee merely swore to "support and defend the
constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic"; that he would "bear true faith and allegiance to the
same"; and that he would "well and faithfully discharge the duties
of [his] office." 6 An oath in this form had been required of Arizona's public employees since 1901.7 In 1961, however, the legislature, in adopting Arizona's version of the Communist Control Act,8
put a gloss on the 1901 oath that, in effect, turned it into a more
typical loyalty oath. Section 5 of the Arizona Communist Control
Act made it a crime "subject to all the penalties for perjury" for
any employee, having taken the positive oath of allegiance, thereafter "knowingly and willfully" ( 1) to "commit or aid in the
commission of any act to overthrow [the state government] by
force or violence," (2) to advocate the overthrow of the state
government by such means, or ( 3) to "become or remain a member of the Communist party, its subordinate organizations, or any
ANN., tit. 21, ch. 52, §§ 1266.4, 1266.6 (1965 Supp.); PA. STAT. ANN., tit, 65, ch. 11,
§§ 212, 213, 214 (1965 Supp.); see also IND, STAT, ANN., tit, 10, ch. 52, §§ 10-5203,
10-5207 (1965 Supp.).
4 See ACLU, Feature Press Service Bulletin, § 2266, May 16, 1966.
5 See BROWN, LoYALTY AND SECURITY 92-95 (1958); Koenigsberg & Stavis, Test
Oaths: Henry VIII to the American Bar Association, 11 LAW, GUILD REV, 111 (1951).
See generally HYMAN, To TRY MEN's SoULs (1960),
6

ARIZ. STAT.§ 38-231 (1965 Supp.).
7 Aa_1z. REv. _STAT, § 222 (1901). The oath was originally adopted while Arizona
was sttll a ter~1tory, and consequently was amended in several respects when Arizona was admJtted to statehood.
8 Ariz. Laws 1961, c. 108, § 1-9.
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other organization having for one of its purposes the overthrow
by force or violence of the [state] government" where the employee
"had knowledge of said unlawful purpose of said organization or
organizations." 9 To supplement § 5, the Arizona act also required
all government employees to resubscribe to the oath of allegiance
as interpreted in the light of the new section. 10
Petitioner Elfbrandt, a teacher in the Tucson public schools,
refused to take the oath and brought suit in the Arizona state courts
to have the state oath requirement declared unconstitutional.11
That litigation lasted five years and was twice taken to the United
States Supreme Court before the Arizona statute was finally held
unconstitutional. 12
9 That section amended § 38-231 to read as follows: "E. Any officer or employee
as defined in this section having taken the form of oath or affirmation prescribed by
this section, and knowingly or wilfully at the time of subscribing the oath or
affirmation, or at any time thereafter during his term of office or employment, does
commit or aid in the commission of any act to overthrow by force or violence the
government of this state or of any of its political subdivisions, or advocates the
overthrow by force or violence of the government of this state or of any of its
political subdivisions, or during such term of office or employment knowingly and
wilfully becomes or remains a member of the communist party of the United
States or its successors or any of its subordinate organizations or any other organization having for one of its purposes the overthrow by force or violence of the government of the state of Arizona or any of its political subdivisions, and said officer
or employee as defined in this section prior to becoming or remaining a member of
such organization or organizations had knowledge of said unlawful purpose of
said organization or organizations, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction
thereof shall be subject to all the penalties for perjury; in addition, upon conviction under this section, the officer or employee shall be deemed discharged from
said office or employment and shall not be entitled to any additional compensation
or any other emoluments or benefits which may have been incident or appurtenant
to said office or employment."
All references to § 5 in the text of this article refer to this provision, now ARIZ.
REv. STAT. § 38-231E (1965 Supp.).

10

ARIZ. REv. STAT.

§

8-231 (c) (1965 Supp.).

11

~!though_ the Arizona act requires all employees to take the oath, the only
sanct10~ _provided. for failure to do so is denial of compensation. Consequently,
the pet1t10ner retained her job and simply continued to teach without pay. This
aspect of the case attracted at least as much attention from the press as did the
Co~~t's opinion. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, supra note 2. The back pay accumulated by
peanoner and her husband, a fellow teacher who also refused to take the oath
am?unted to over $60,000, but apparently the school boards involved were no~
enn_r?ly sure of the Elfbrandts' right to the money even after the Supreme Court
dec1s10n. Ann Arbor News, June 23, 1966, p. 7, cols. 2-5.
12

Th~. Arizon~ Supreme Court later found in an opinion as yet unreported that
the petitioner still was required to take the oath, although the special gloss of
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On the first appeal to the Supreme Court, an Arizona Supreme
Court decision upholding the oath was vacated, 13 and the case was
remanded for reconsideration in the light of Baggett v. Bullitt.14
In Baggett the Supreme Court had found unconstitutionally vague
a Washington oath that contained language very much like that
found in the first clause of § 5.15 On remand, however, a majority
of the Arizona court found that Baggett was inapplicable since the
reference in § 5 to activity aiding an act designed to overthrow the
government had a much narrower and more traditional scope than
did a similar reference in the Washington oath. 16 One member
of the Arizona court, Justice Bernstein, dissented on the ground
that Baggett was controlling. 17 The dissent was not based on the
first clause of § 5, however, but was tied entirely to the third
clause of that section, which prohibits an employee from knowingly
becoming a member of any organization "having for one of its
purposes the overthrow by force or violence of the government." 18
Justice Bernstein found that this clause failed adequately to identify
the nature of the organization in which membership was barred,
and, therefore, that it was unconstitutionally vague. As an illustration, he pointed to the university scientist, who, he said, "could
not know whether membership is prohibited in an international
scientific organization which includes members from neutralist
nations and Communist bloc nations-the latter admittedly dedicated
to the overthrow of our government and which control the organization. . .. Though all might agree that the principal purpose of
such organization is scientific, the statute makes [ the scientist's]
membership a crime if any subordinate purpose is the· overthrow
§ 38-231E was no longer applicable. See Ann Arbor News, June 23, 1966, p. 7, cols.
2-5.
13

378 U.S. 127 (1964), vacating 94 Ariz. 1 (1963).

377 U.S. 360 (1964).
15 Washington required public employees to swear that they were not subversive persons as defined by statute: "'Subversive person' means any person who
commits, attempts to commit, or aids in the commission, or advocates, abets,
advises or teaches by any means any person to commit, attempt to commit, or aid
in the commission of any act intended to overthrow, destroy or alter, or to assist
in the overthrow, destruction or alteration of the constitutional form of the government of the United States, or of the state of Washington or any political subdivision of either of them by revolution, force, or violence ...."Wash.Laws 1955,
c. 377.
14

1697 Ariz.140 (1965).

17

/d. at 147.

18

See note 9 supra.
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of the state government." "The vice of vagueness here," he concluded, "is that the scientist cannot know whether membership
in the organization would result in a prosecution for violation of
[§ 5] or in honors from his university for the encyclopedic knowledge acquired ... in part through his membership." 19
B. THE MAJORITY OPINION

On review of the Arizona decision, Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for himself, the Chief Justice, and Justices Black, Brennan, and
Fortas, agreed with Justice Bernstein that the invalidity of the
third or so-called membership clause of § 5 rendered Arizona's
oath requirement unconstitutional. In reaching this conclusion,
however, the majority opinion, though quoting extensively from
Justice Bernstein's dissent, did not rely upon the "void for vagueness" rationale that he had used. 20 Rather, Mr. Justice Douglas'
opinion was based squarely on the ground that the membership
clause of § 5 violated a basic principle restricting the scope of
statutes affecting First Amendment rights. Quoting from Cantwell
v. Connecticut and Shelton v. Tucker, Mr. Justice Douglas described that principle as follows: 21
"[A] statute touching ... protected rights must be narrowly
drawn to define and punish specific conduct as constituting a
clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the state."
... Legitimate legislative goals "cannot be pursued by means
that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved."

Mr. Justice Douglas found that the Arizona statute failed to meet
this standard because it applied to employees who might knowingly
join organizations favoring violent overthrow of the government
but who themselves might not subscribe to that goal. In including
such persons, § 5 necessarily relied, said Mr. Justice Douglas, on
an improper theory of "guilt by association" and the section therefore had "infringe [d] unnecessarily" on protected First Amendment rights. 22
The crux of the reasoning that led Mr. Justice Douglas to this
19

97 Ariz. at 147-48.

20

384 U.S. at 14-15.

Id. at 18, quoting from Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940), and
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 ( 1960).
21

22

384 U.S. at 19.
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conclusion is found in several paragraphs toward the end of his
opinion. 23 First, he noted that in Scales v. United States, 24 the Court
had recognized that " 'a blanket prohibition of association with a
group having both legal and illegal aims' would pose 'a real danger
that legitimate political expression or association would be impaired.' " 25 Accordingly, the Court in Scales had carefully limited
the application of the membership clause of the Smith Act to those
members of organizations advocating overthrow who were both
"active" in their membership and had the "specific intent of assisting in achieving the unlawful ends of the organization.'' 26 The
constitutional significance of the "specific intent" requirement imposed by Scales had been clearly established in Aptheker v. Secretary of State 21 when the Court voided a statute prohibiting the
issuance of passports to members of "Communist organizations"
precisely because that statute "covered membership which was not
accompanied by a specific intent to further the unlawful aims of
the organization." 28 The Arizona "oath and accompanying statutory gloss suffer from an identical constitutional infirmity" as
the statute in Aptheker29 Under § 5 a state employee who knowingly joins an organization "which has as 'one of its purposes' the
violent overthrow of the government is subject to immediate discharge and criminal penalties" even though he "does not subscribe
to the organization's unlawful ends." 30 As a result, here, as in Baggett v. Bullitt, persons risk prosecution by engaging in "knowing
but guiltless" activity. Illustrative might be the teacher who attends the Pugwash Conference or "joins a seminar group predominantly Communist and therefore subject to control by those who
are said to believe in the overthrow of the government.'' 31 Surely, Mr. Justice Douglas continued: 32 "Those who join an organization but do not share its unlawful purposes and who do not
participate in its unlawful activities pose no threat, either as citizens or public employees." A law which encompasses such persons "impose[s], in effect, a conclusive presumption that the member shares the unlawful aims of the organizations," and for that
reason alone is clearly unconstitutional. 33 Summarizing the Court's
position at the conclusion of the opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas
wrote: 34
2a Id. at 15-18.
367 U.S. 203 (1961).
2s 384 U.S. at 15.

378 U.S. 500 (1964).
2s 384 U.S. at 16.

31

24

33

26

Ibid.
so Ibid.

Ibid.

21

29

32

Id.atl7.

Ibid.
Ibid.
34 Id. at 19.
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A law which applies to membership without "the specific intent" to further the illegal aims of the organization infringes
unnecessarily on protected freedoms. It rests on the doctrine of
"guilt by association" which has no place here .... Such a law
cannot stand.
C. THE DISSENTING OPINION

Mr. Justice White's dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clark,
Harlan, and Stewart, noted at the outset that "[a]ccording to unequivocal prior holdings of this Court, a state is entitled to condition public employment upon its employees abstaining from
knowing membership in . . . organizations advocating the violent
overthrow of the government which employs them," and "the
state is [also] constitutionally authorized to inquire into such affiliations and ... discharge those who refuse to affirm or deny
them." 35 The dissent cited eight previous decisions in support of
this proposition, and noted that Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion "does
not mention or purport to overrule these cases." 36 Neither does
the majority opinion, as Mr. Justice White read it, "expressly hold"
that a state "must retain" as employees those who knowingly hold
membership in organizations aiming at violent overthrow. "It
would seem, therefore," he concluded, "that the Court's judgment
is only aimed at the criminal provisions of the Arizona law which
exposes an employee to a perjury prosecution if he swears falsely
about membership when he signs the oath or if he later becomes
a knowing member while remaining in public employment." 37
Mr. Justice White then argued that the distinction the Court
appears to have drawn between criminal and civil sanctions is
invalid. The right to punish for intentional falsification is clear
from prior cases. As for the punishment of employees who later
join an organization of the proscribed rype: 38 "If a State may disqualify for knowing membership . . . , it is likewise within its
85

Ibid.

86 Id. at 20. Six cases were cited directly: Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341
U.S. 56 (1951); Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); Adler v.
Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S.
399 (1958); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958); Nelson v. County of Los Angeles,
362 U.S. 1 (1960). The dissent cited as "see also" two other cases: Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551

(1956).
87

384 U.S. at 20.

as Id. at 21.
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powers to move criminally against the employee who knowingly
engages in disqualifying acts during his employment." "The
crime provided by the Arizona law," Mr. Justice White emphasized, "is not just the act of becoming a member of an organization
39
but it is that membership plus concurrent public employment."
The dissent also argued that "there is nothing in Scales ... or
40
Aptheker ... dictating the result reached by the Court." Scales
involved the general criminal provisions of the Smith Act and
therefore was not in point. Neither was Aptheker, since the statutory provision involved there applied to members who actually
lacked knowledge of the organization's illicit purpose. In fact,
Speiser v. Randall,41 another case cited by the majority, had "carefully preserved" Gerende v. Board of Supervisors42 and Garner
v. Board of Public W orks,43 two cases upholding test oaths for
employees that were based on the same principles as the Arizona
oath. Finally, Mr. Justice White suggested that even if one were
to accept the majority's position and were to hold that Arizona
may not take criminal action against employees who are knowing
members of organizations aiming at violent overthrow of the government, the appropriate remedy would not be to invalidate the
Arizona oath requirement as the majority had done, but to remand
the case to the state court to determine the severability of the criminal provisions of the Arizona statute.
D. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SILENCE

When viewed in light of the dissent, two aspects of Mr. Justice
Douglas' opinion immediately stand out. Both deal, not unsurprisingly, more with what the opinion left unsaid than with what
i~ said. T!1e first is the complete absence of any reply to the dissent,
either with respect to its narrow characterization of the majority
ruling or with respect to the cases Mr. Justice White cited as
clearly controlling if the majority had sought to rely on a broader
~round. ~h~ seco~d _is the absence in both opinions, but particularly
m the maionty opm10n, of any meaningful discussion of the nature
of _th_e state's ~nt:rests in the loyalty oath requirement. These
onnssions are sigmficant for more than the light they may shed
39

Ibid.

41

357 U.S. 513 (1958).

40

Id. at 22.

42

341 U.S. 56 (1951).

43

Id. at 716.
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on the professional quality of the Court's opinion. The inferences
to be drawn from the opinion's silence on these matters probably
will determine what impact Elf brandt will have upon the permissible scope and coverage of loyalty oaths.

II.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION

Dissenting opinions are hardly the best source for determining the breadth of a majority ruling. This is particularly true when
a case is decided by a close vote as Elf brandt was, and when the
dissent is concerned with the next case and the possibility of accomplishing a shift in the Court's position not inconsistent with
the immediate decision. Nevertheless, Mr. Justice White's characterization of the Court's ruling as grounded solely on Arizona's
use of criminal sanctions finds just enough support in the majority
opinion that it cannot be dismissed out of hand as simply a dissenter's tactic.
First, there is the fact that the majority made no effort to reply to
Mr. Justice White's statement of its ruling. Admittedly Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion does not place primary emphasis on the
criminal sanctions imposed by § 5, although it does make frequent
mention of these sanctions. 44 It is also true, as will be seen later,
that the cases cited by Mr. Justice White as otherwise controlling
are distinguishable on grounds other than Arizona's reliance on
criminal sanctions in § 5. 45 Still, since it would have taken so little
flatly to reject Mr. Justice White's interpretation, it is difficult to
understand why this was not done. Perhaps Mr. Justice Douglas,
who had dissented in several of the cases cited by Mr. Justice
White, felt that any attempt to distinguish those cases would give
them undue recognition. 46 Perhaps the majority's failure to reply
to the dissent reflects no more than the often criticized tendency
of members of the present Court to engage "in separate monologues rather than a dialogue." 47 Yet the absence of any reply to
an obvious attempt to limit a majority opinion is unusual, and a
44

See 384 U.S. at 16-17.

45

See text infra, at section III.

Mr. Justice Douglas dissented in five of the eight cases cited by Mr. Justice
White: Garner, Adler, Beilan, Lerner, and Nelson. See note 36 supra.
46

47 Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Adjudication: Of Politics and
Neutral Principles, 31 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 587,591 (1963).
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possible inference therefrom is that at least one member of the
majority accepted Mr. Justice White's interpretation of its ruli~gAnother element that may be cited in support of Mr .. Jusnce
White's interpretation is the fact that the two cases on which Mr.
Justice Douglas relied most heavily, Scales and Aptheker, both
involved criminal statutes. 48 Moreover, insofar as Scales was concerned, it was commonly recognized that the Court there had
employed a standard of review far different from that used in
49
previous loyalty oath cases, such as Garner and Gerende. • • ,
Nevertheless, Mr. Justice White's interpretation of the maionty s
ruling is most difficult to accept because such a decision would
be unsupportable in either precedent or logic. Admittedly, the
Court has generally distinguished statutes imposing criminal sanctions on speech or association, such as the Smith Act, from statutes
imposing more "limited" sanctions, such as disqualification from
employment under a state loyalty program. No matter whether
the standard has been described in terms of balancing, overbroadness, or defining protected speech, the Court has always given
considerably more leeway to a legislature's non-criminal sanctions.50 Thus, in the Hatch Act case, United Public Workers v.
48 Scales involved a criminal prosecution under the Smith Act. 18 U.S.C. § 2385.
Aptheker involved a suit for a declaratory judgment in which the Court was asked
to declare unconstitutional a criminal provision of the Subversive Activities Control Act, 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1964).
49 Although the Court had not actually discussed Scales as it related to the
loyalty oath cases, the First Amendment issues in Scales were resolved largely on
the basis of Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Dennis involved a considerably more restrictive standard of review than the loyalty oath cases. See, e.g.,
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,

527-28 (1958).

~o I~ ~on(gsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961), Mr. Justice Harlan described
this distmct10~-actually based on the function of the restriction on speech-in
terms of the difference between those cases in which the Court determines whether
"th~ speech ... [is] ?utside the scope of constitutional protection" and those in
which the Court apphes what is commonly referred to as the "balancing" test. Id.
at 49-51. Unfortunately, the wide-ranging debate over use of "balancing" in First
Amendme_nt cases has_r~nde? to obscure the distinction drawn by Mr. Justice Harlan. C,::ertamly, all decis10ns m this area, whether phrased in terms of balancing or
de~nm? the scope of "pr?tected" speech necessarily involve an evaluation of competmg mterests. See Nutting, ls the First Amendment Obsolete? 30 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 167 (1961); Karst, Legislative Fact in Constitutional Litigation [1960] SUPREME
CouRr_REv1Ew 7!, 95. I~ is als_o true t~at_ the Coun may sometimes ~peak in terms of
balancmg even m dealmg with restr1ct.10ns upon borderline classes of speech. See,
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Mitchell, 51 the Court sustained the power of the federal government to discharge employees who engaged in certain political
activities, although a criminal statute inhibiting such action by
the general public clearly would be unconstitutional. 02 The
distinction drawn in Mitchell and similar cases has not, however,
rested on the nature of the sanction employed by the legislature,
but on the purpose of the legislation. 53 Criminal sanctions genere.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,510 (1951), dealing with speech advocating illegal activity. But the type of balancing referred to by Mr. Justice Harlan in
Konigsberg rests upon an entirely different approach, if not a different process,
than that balancing involved without recognition in the obscenity cases and with
recognition in Dennis. See generally Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note
on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," [1964] SUPREME CouRT REv1EW
191, 213-17. But see Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L. J. 1424,
1429-32 (1962).
Unlike Dennis and other cases involving direct restraints, the Court in Elfbrandt
does not proceed from the premise that there is a central core area of clearly protected speech and the relation of the legislatively proscribed speech to that core
will, in large measure, determine the constitutionality of the proscription. See
Kalven, supra, at 204--11. See also Dennis v. United States, 183 F.2d 201, 207 (2d
Cir. 1950). Since the legislative restriction on speech in Mr. Justice Harlan's second
category of cases is an incidental aspect of a general regulation, the nature of the
speech involved obviously becomes less significant, and the basic assumption is that
"compelling" state interest will justify an incidental restriction imposed even on
speech within the central core area. See generally Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,
524 (1960). Accordingly, the Court's approach to "weighing" competing interests
in this class of cases is much more akin to the normal standard of substantive due
process than is the evaluation of the nature of the speech and the legislative interest
in cases of direct restraints on speech, such as Dennis, or New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
51

330 U.S. 75 (1947).

52

ld. at 101-04. The political activity involved in the case before the Court was
participation "as [an] executive committeeman and a worker at the polls." Id. at 103.
53 Although the Court in Mitchell did not attempt to distinguish cases involving
restrictions aimed directly at the content of speech, it did emphasize that the congressional purpose in the Hatch Act was to preserve the efficiency of the federal
service and not to restrict political activities. See 330 U.S. at 101-04. The distinction
between cases like Mitchell and those involving direct restraints on speech was
clearly stated in later cases. In Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961),
the Court described that distinction as follows: "Throughout its history this Court
has consistently recognized at least two ways in which constitutionally protected
freedom of speech is narrower than an unlimited license to talk. On the one hand
certain forms of speech, or speech in certain contexts, have been considered outside the scope of constitutional protection. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568; Dennis v. United States
341 U.S. 494; Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250; Yates v. United States, 354
298; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476. On the other hand, general regulatory

u.s'.
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ally have been used in legislation aimed directly at suppressin~ a
particular class of speech, either because of disagreement with
54
its content or concern for its impact upon an audience. The
more limited sanctions, such as disqualification from public office
or the denial of permission to use public streets for political rallies,
are usually found in legislation aimed at the prevention of certain
conduct other than that produced by the speech. 55 The regula~ion
of speech in these circumstances imposes what the Court describes
as an "indirect" restriction on speech, an "incidental" by-product
of the prohibition of undesirable conduct.56 Thus, the purpose of
the Hatch Act was not to suppress political activitie_s, but to pr~vent a situation conducive to the administrative evils of a spoils
system.57 Similarly, prohibitions against the employment of pe~sons who advocate the overthrow of the government have traditionally been looked upon as an "indirect" restriction on speech
because the legislation is aimed not at the content of the speech,
statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but incidentally limiting its
unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type of law the First or Fourteenth Amendments forbade Congress or the state to pass, when they have been
found justified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequisite to
constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of the governmental
interest involved. See e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77; American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382; Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622." See also American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382, 396, 399 (1950). But cf. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 456---00 (1965).
54 See, e.g., the first group of cases cited by Mr. Justice Harlan in the excerpt
from Konigsberg quoted in note 53 supra.
55 See, e.g., American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 396 (1950):
"But the question w_ith which we are here faced is not the same one that Justices
Holmes and Brandeis found convenient to consider in terms of clear and present
dang_er. Gov:rnment's inter:st here is ?ot in preventing the dissemination of Commumst_ docu:me or the holdmg of parucular beliefs because it is feared that unlaw~ul action will result therefrom if free speech is practiced. Its interest is in protectmg the free flow of commerce from what Congress considers to be substantial evils
of conduct that are not the products of speech at II S · 9 (h) ·
h
d
does not interfere with s e ch b
a . ecuon
' m ot er wor s,
.
Pe
ecause Congress fears the consequences of speech·
1t regulates
harmful .conduct which Congress has d etermme
· d 1s
· carne
· d on b y per-'
h
;on~ w O Rmayd bile identifie_d by their political affiliations and beliefs." See also
pe1ser v. an a , quoted infra note 58.
56 See Konigsberg v State Bar 366 US
36 49
U.S. 513, 527 (1958) · American Co
· .' ? -Sl (1961); Speiser v. Randall, 357
399 (1950).
'
mmurucattons Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 396,
57

330 U.S. at 102--03.
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but at the potential performance of the speaker in public office.
The reference to the speech of a particular content is viewed, in
effect, merely as a means of identifying a person who is more
likely to engage in undesirable conduct as an employee. 58
While not all the members of the Court have agreed that
statutes restricting government employment on the basis of speech
or association should be characterized as indirect restraints on
speech, generally they all do recognize that the key to such characterization must be the purpose of the legislation, not the nature
of the sanction used to implement that purpose. 59 The Court has
58 See note 56 supra. See also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 527 (1958): "The
appellees, in controverting this position, rely on cases in which this Court has sustained the validity of loyalty oaths required of public employees, Garner v. Board
of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716; candidates for public office, Gerende v. Board of
Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56, and officers of labor unions, American Communications
Assn. v. Douds, supra. In these cases, however, there was no attempt directly to
control speech but rather to protect, from an evil shown to be grave, some interest
clearly within the sphere of governmental concern. The purpose of the legislation
sustained in the Douds case, the Court found, was to minimize the danger of political strikes disruptive of interstate commerce by discouraging labor unions from
electing Communist Party members to union office. While the Court recognized
that the necessary effect of the legislation was to discourage the exercise of rights
protected by the First Amendment, this consequence was said to be only indirect.
The congressional purpose was to achieve an objective other than restraint on
speech. Only the method of achieving this end touched on protected rights and
that only tangentially. The evil at which Congress had attempted to strike in that
case was thought sufficiently grave to justify limited infringement of political
rights. Similar considerations governed the other cases. Each case concerned a
limited class of persons in or aspiring to public positions by virtue of which they
could, if evilly motivated, create serious danger to the public safety. The principal
aim of those statutes was not to penalize political beliefs but to deny positions to
persons supposed to be dangerous because the position might be misused to the
detriment of the public."
But cf. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 456--60 (1965). Brown possibly
could be extended further to undermine this line of analysis. The Court there
suggested that the legislative purpose to prohibit misuses of office could constitute
"punishment" for the purposes of the bill of attainder prohibition. Whether the
Court would then use the clause to invalidate a restriction stated in terms of a
class larger than the membership of a particular organization remains to be seen.
Certainly the opinion in Brown and certain aspects of Elfbrandt indicate it would
not. 381 U.S. at 461-62; see text infra, at note 111-14.
59 Of the present Justices who were then sitting, only Justices Black and Douglas
did not join in the characterization of the loyalty oath cases as indirect restraints
in Konigsberg or Speiser, supra note 56. Both Justices have rejected the application of the "balancing" test in these cases, but this stems from their belief that
loyalty oaths are not really aimed at preventing misuse of conduct, but are "direct"
restrictions designed primarily to punish speech. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366
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recognized that indirect restraints e.g., a limitation on the use of
sound amplifiers, may be enforced by criminal sanctions. 60 The
Court has also recognized that direct restraints need not always
take the form of criminal prohibitions, as is illustrated by the
restriction on the receipt of mail recently invalidated in Lamont
v. Postmaster, 61 and the denial of a veterans' tax exemption voided
in Speiser v. Randall. 62 To be sure, the purpose of the legislation
has not always been clearly identified as the important factor in
distinguishing between direct and indirect restraints. 63 As a result,
there has been occasional confusion in the lower courts, 64 as indeed
was exhibited by the Arizona Supreme Court in its first consideration of the Elf brandt case. 65 But the Supreme Court itself has consistently recognized the basis of the distinction, although there
has often been disagreement over its application. 66 Accordingly,
whatever limitation Elf brandt imposes upon the use of political
association as a basis for restricting employment should, accord!ng
to precedent, be applicable irrespective of whether the state implements its policy by discharging the employee or by imposing
penal sanctions. Moreover, precedents aside, a different result
would make little sense in terms of any theory of First Amendment
U.S. 36, 56, 68-70 (1960); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134, 141-53
(1959); Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399, 412, 414--15 (1958); Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952). It is not entirely clear whether their view
is based primarily on the history of loyalty oaths or on a general suspicion of any
standard that operates with reference to the content of speech. Compare Wieman
and Barenblatt, supra, with Konigsberg. In any event, it is clear that both Justices
recognize the special nature of incidental restrictions on speech where it is clear
that the restriction is not "aimed at speech" and does not "depend for its application upon the content of speech." Konigsberg v. State Bar, supra, at 70. See also
Barenblatt v. United States, supra; Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 237, 249, 250-51 (1942).
60 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). See also Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U.S. 569 (1941); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
61

381 U.S. 301 (1965), especially at 307-08 (Brennan, J.).

62

357 U.S. 513 (1958).

63

See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952); Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).
64
See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 334 F.2d 488, 492-96 (9th Cir. 1964), affirmed
on other grounds, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); Weaver v. Jordan, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537, 543
(1966); In re Schlessinger, 404 Pa. 584 (1961).
65 94 Ariz. at 9-10.
66

See Kalven, supra note 50, at 216.
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protection, especially in view of the fact that, as the Court itself
of ten has recognized, non-criminal sanctions may often pose more
of a danger to the preservation of protected rights than criminal
sanctions. 67
In the light of this background, Mr. Justice White's interpretation of the majority ruling may be nothing more than an artfully
employed "straw man." The failure of the majority opinion to
reply to the dissent on this point probably can be attributed to
Mr. Justice Douglas' views on the art of opinion writing. 68 The
citation of Scales without mention of the difference in the nature
of the statute there involved can probably be similarly explained.
Mr. Justice Douglas has never been willing to accept the premise
that loyalty oath cases should be treated as indirect restrictions on
speech, 69 and, in large degree, he has been unwilling even to acknowledge that previous decisions have drawn a distinction between statutes like the Smith Act and employment disqualification
provisions. 70 Also, since Aptheker, a case involving an indirect restraint under the traditional view, had already drawn upon reasoning similar to that employed in Scales, the distinction between
the Smith Act and the Arizona legislation may well have been
viewed as without importance for the purpose of applying Scales
to this case. 71

III.

THE SCOPE oF ELFBRANDT: SuB SrLENTIO OvERRULING

The rejection of Mr. Justice White's interpretation of the
Court's ruling does not eliminate all the problems presented by
the majority's failure to respond to the argument of the dissent.
There remains in particular the several cases cited by Mr. Justice
White as generally controlling if the majority opinion were not
67 See e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277-78 (1964); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); see also In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959).

68 See generally Rogat, Mr. Justice Pangloss, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Oct. 22, 1964,
pp. 5-7; see also Kurland, Foreword, "Equal in Origin and Equal in T~tle to the
Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government," 78 HARV, L. REv. 143, 167-

68 (1964).
69

See note 60 supra.

See, e.g., Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 261 (1961) (dissenting opinion)
(relying on Scales and Yates in a loyalty test case).
70

71 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 511-12 (1964); cf. United States
v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,456 (1965),
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narrowly based on Arizona's use of criminal sanctions to implement its loyalty oath.
Six of the eight cases cited by the dissent can be distinguished
without serious difficulty. Four, Lerner v. Casey ,12 Beilan v. Board
of Education,73 Nelson v. County of Los Angeles,74 and Slochower
v. Board of Education,75 deal solely with the right of federal or
state officials to require an employee to reveal any past or present
membership in organizations advocating violent overthrow of the
government. 76 The determination that state and federal authorities
had this power in no way established that such membership alone is
an adequate basis for denying employment. The Court's rulings
only indicated that the subject of the state's inquiry could be
relevant to some valid standard for disqualification. 77 Since a question is relevant if it relates to any aspect of the state's standard,
inquiry about membership in an organization advocating overthrow clearly would be relevant even under a standard that, consistent with Elf brandt, was limited to exclusion only of those
members who had a specific intent to further the illegal aims of
the organization. ·
Both Wieman v. Updegraff 78 and Adler v. Board of Education79
deal directly with use of speech and association as a basis for denying government employment, but they too can be distinguished.
In Wieman, the Court voided an Oklahoma loyalty oath on the
ground that it indiscriminately barred from employment all members of organizations advocating violent overthrow regardless of
whether the members were aware of the organization's illegal
12

357 U.S. 468 (1958).

74

362 U.S. l (1960).

73

357 U.S. 399 (1958).

75

350 U.S. 551 (1956).

76 In Slochower the Court found that the state acted arbitrarily in discharging
the petitioner solely because he relied upon the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination to refuse to answer an inquiry concerning past membership in
the Commu_ni~t par~. Beilan, Lerner, and Nelson all upheld discharges under
somewhat similar c1rcumstances when the state based the discharge upon the
employee's general lack of co-operativeness in failing to answer the inquiries,
rather than upon his use of the privilege. See, e.g., Nelson v. County of Los Angeles,
362 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1960).
77 See, e.g., Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468, 474, 477 (1958) where the Court
specifically noted th:t it need not detcr:nine whether the parti,cular standard employed by the state m that case was valid. See also Beilan v. Board of Education,
357 U.S. 399,405 (1958); Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1, 8 (1960).
78

344 U.S. 183 (1952).

79

342 U.S. 485 (1952).
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purpose. While the opm10n did not mention that the oath also
failed to except the member who knew of, but did not share, that
purpose, little significance can be attached to that omission, since
the Court had no reason to consider the need for a "specific intent" requirement once the statute was found unconstitutional on
other grounds. 80 In Adler, the Court sustained the New York
loyalty program for teachers under the Feinberg Law. The Court's
opinion dealt primarily with a provision making knowing membership in an organization advocating violent overthrow "prima facie
evidence" of disqualification for employment. 81 Although the
Feinberg Law was supposedly designed to implement a statute
that denied employment to all knowing members of such organizations, 82 the Court's opinion indicates that it assumed, probably
on the basis of a lower court opinion, 83 that an employee could
successfully rebut the prima facie case by showing that he did
not share the illegal aims of the organization. 84
Gerende v. Board of Supervisors 85 and Garner v. Board of
so The arguments advanced by the Court in rejecting the Oklahoma oath related
solely to the member who was unaware of the organization's illegal objectives and
were not readily applicable to the knowing member who did not subscribe to the
organization's illegal goals. See 344 U.S. at 190---91.
81

N.Y. Eouc. LAw § 3022.

82 The Feinberg Law does require the removal of all "subversive persons from
the public school system," but it does not define "subversive persons." The Act
defines subversive organizations, however, as those that advocate, advise, embrace,
or teach the doctrine of violent overthrow. The N.Y. C1v1L SERVICE LAW § 12(a),
the Act that the Feinberg Law was designed to implement, see 342 U.S. at 48789, provides for the disqualification from public employment of any person who
"becomes a member of any . . . group . . . which teaches or advocates that the
government of the United States or of any state ... shall be overthrown by force
or violence ...." Accordingly the significance of the provision making membership in such organizations constitute only prima facie evidence of disqualification
is not entirely clear from the face of the statute.
83 See L'Hommedieu v. Board of Regents, 97 N.Y.S.2d 443, 452-53 (App. Div. 3d
Dept. 1950), aff'd, 301 N.Y. 476 (1950). L'Hommedieu was a companion case to
Adler.
84 See 342 U.S. at 495-96, emphasizing the individual's opportunity to rebut the
prima facie presumption arising from knowing membership. See also id. at 492,
noting that only "unexplained" knowing membership in an organization advocating
overthrow constituted a basis for removal under the New York statute.
The decision in Nostrand v. Little, 368 U.S. 436 (1962), apparently was based
on the same assumption as Adler. See 362 U.S. 474 (1960); 58 Wash.2d 111 (1961).

85

341 U.S. 56 (1951).
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Public 1Vorks 86 also deal directly with the state's P?wer t~ ~eny
employment to individuals solely on the basis of their assoc1auons,
but these cases are difficult to distinguish from Elfbrandt. In
Gerende, a unanimous Court, including Justices Black and Do~~las,
upheld a Maryland requirement that every candidate for P?httcal
office "make oath that he is not a person who is engaged 'm one
way or another in the attempt to overthrow the government by
force or violence,' and that he is not knowingly a member of an
organization engaged in such an attempt." 87 Although the Maryland oath made no exception for knowing members who lacked
88
the specific intent to support the organization's illegal goals,
the Court sustained the state oath requirement in a one-paragraph
per curiam opinion that made no mention of the specific intent
question. Gerende can nevertheless be distinguished from Elfbrandt on two grounds. First-and this ground will be ~iscuss_ed
more fully-the oath in Gerende was limited to officrnls with
policy-making functions. 89 Second, the Maryland oath might be
interpreted as applying only to membership in organizations engaged in a present attempt to overthrow the government. Knowing membership in such a group could be distinguished from membership in a group that had merely advocated violent overthrow
sometime in the future, on the ground that the immediate danger
presented by the first type of organization so clearly established
the individual's support for the organization's illegal objective
that inquiry into his "specific intent" was unnecessary. Such a
narrow interpretation of the Maryland oath, however, is subject
to question. The oath applies to attempts "in one way or another"
to overthrow the government, and this might well require no
more than advocacy itself, especially when it is remembered that
ss 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
87

Id. at 56-57. (Emphasis in original.)

88

Moreover, there w~s nothing in the opinion of the Maryland Court of Appeals
to sugge st that a requirement of "specific intent" had been read into the state
statute. See Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177 (1950).
89 See infra, at section VI. Although it is possible that not all elected officials
would possess ·thet" type of
authority that m1g
· h t b e mampu
· 1ate d to
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.
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the concept of advocacy used in this area is that of urging future
action in language "reasonably and ordinarily calculated to incite
persons to such action." 00 If this broad interpretation of the Maryland oath is accepted, then Gerende presents, aside from the first
ground of distinction, the same difficulty in reconciliation with
Elf brandt as Garner.
In Garner, the Court upheld a statute denying employment to
any person who within five years had been a knowing member of
any organization that "advised, advocated, or taught the overthrow by force or violence" of the state or federal government. 91
Although no mention of the point was made in either the majority
or dissenting opinions (including those of Justices Black and Douglas),92 the statute in Garner clearly would exclude from employment knowing members who lacked the specific intent to further
the organization's unlawful aims. 93 Garner therefore seems, at
least on the surface, to be in direct conflict with Elfbrandt. Yet,
cases are not ordinarily overruled sub silentio,94 and Mr. Justice
00
See Yates v. United Scates, 354 U.S. 298, 316 (1957); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 511-12 (1951). The same standard is ordinarily applied to loyalty
oaths. See, e.g., 94 Ariz. at 8. Of course, Gerende was decided before Dennis and

Yates, but this would not have prevented the Court from viewing "Yates-style"
advocacy as constituting an attempt "in one way or another co overthrow the
government by force and violence."
91

341 U.S. at 717-18.

92 The

dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Black,
concentrated entirely on the contention that the Los Angeles ordinance was a bill
of attainder. See 341 U.S. at 731-33. Mr. Justice Black's short dissenting opinion
briefly mentioned the First Amendment issue, but discussed it in general terms. Id.
at 730-31. Both Mr. Justice Frankfurter's separate opinion and Mr. Justice Clark's
opinion for the Court did discuss that issue, however, in connection with the possible application of the ordinance to members who were unaware of an organization's illegal activity, the majority assuming that the statute incorporated a requirement of scienter, and Mr. Justice Frankfurter finding the statute unconstitutional
because that assumption reasonably could not be made. Id. at 720-21, 723-24, 724.
93 But see Horowitz, Report 011 the Los Angeles City and County Loyalty Progrmns, 5 STANFORD L. REv. 233, 244 (1953), possibly suggesting that the element of
scienter read into the ordinance in Garner might make the ordinance inapplicable
to the "employee [who] was a member of the organization but continually fought
against policies of overthrow." The language of Garner, however, quite clearly
discussed scienter strictly in terms of knowledge rather than intent. 341 U.S. at
723-24. This was reaffirmed in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).

94See Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, [1963] SUPREME
CoURT REVIEW 211, 214 n. 15, 215-26.
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Douglas' opinion failed to mention the Garner case. It c?~ld reasonably be assumed that there was a basis for reconciling th~
two cases, and that Garner remains controlling precedent until
explicitly overruled. 95
A ground for reconciling Garner and Elf brandt in !act can be
found, if not without difficulty. The Garner statute applied to membership in organizations that were actively engaged in the advocacy
of violent overthrow, and the Court obviously treated it as aimed at
the Communist party or similar organizations that made the over96
throw of the government a dominant organizational goal. Elfbrandt, on the other hand, involves a statute prohibiting employee
membership in an organization that has the violent overthrow of t~e
government merely as "one of its purposes." 97 As Justice Bernstelil
noted in the Arizona court, the Arizona statute would encompass an
organization for which overthrow was merely a "subordinate_ purpose."98 Both Justice Bernstein and Mr. Justice Douglas ment10ned
the possible application of the Arizona statute to a teacher's membership in a seminar group dominated by Communist scientists. Certainly, a member of such a group cannot be compared to a memb~r
of an organization like the Communist party, either in terms of his
contribution to the potential violent overthrow of the government
99
or his lack of dedication to the present form of government. The
Court could have adopted the position that membership in such an
organization does not justify employment disqualification without a
showing of the individual's support for the policy of violent overthrow, al~hough knowing membership in an organization like the
~ommulllSt party would be sufficient justification for disqualification. In any event, the argument might continue, since Elfbrandt
95 Cf. United Stat_es ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S.
103, 112 (1927), notmg the need for caution in drawing "inferences from silence."
96 See 341 U.S. at 719-20. The oath was combined with a requirement that every
employee execute an affidavit stating whether he had ever been a member of the
Communist party. Ibid.
97
~9

See note 9 supra.

98

97 Ariz. at 148; see text supra, at note 19.
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went no further than to declare invalid a law covering the first situation, Garner still remains a valid precedent until the Court faces a
statute dealing solely with membership in groups actively advocating overthrow.
Support for this view of the limited scope of the Elfbrandt opinion can be found in various portions of Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion.
Justice Bernstein's dissent, which was based entirely on the "subordinate purpose" theme, is quoted at length in the majority opinion.100 Mr. Justice Douglas also added his own discussion of the same
point, including his hypotheticals concerning teacher participation
in such events as the Pugwash Conference. Finally, throughout the
majority opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas spoke solely in terms of
organizations with an illegal "purpose" or "aim." No reference is
made to membership in an organization presently advocating overthrow.101 Nevertheless, although these elements of the majority
opinion give this reading of the Court's ruling far more support than
that suggested by Mr. Justice White, it too should be rejected.
If Elf brandt is viewed as going no further than to invalidate a
statute so broad as to encompass membership in a scientific seminar
dominated by Communists, it becomes very difficult indeed to understand why the case was not clearly controlled by Baggett v.
Bullitt,1° 2 and, if so, why (I) two members of the Baggett majority
dissented in Elf brandt103 and (2) the majority relied primarily on
Scales, and Aptheker rather than Baggett. In Baggett, the Court,
with only Justices Clark and Harlan dissenting, held unconstitutional a Washington statute that barred from public employment all
persons, inter alia, who "aid[ed] in the commission of any act intended to overthrow, destroy, or alter or assist in the overthrow, destruction, or alteration" of the state or federal government. 104 While
Mr. Justice White's opinion for the Court was lmsed on the ground
that the statute was unduly vague, this rationale was keyed to the
impact of the statute on First Amendment rights. The vagueness in
the Washington statute entered the picture primarily because a
100 384 U.S. at 14-15. The quotation included the entire discussion by Justice
Bernstein of the "scientist" hypothetical.
101

See, e.g., 384 U.S. at 16, 17.

102

377 U.S. 360 (1964).

The majority in Baggett included Justices White and Stewart, both of whom
dissented in Elfbrandt.
10a

104 377

U.S. at 362.
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literal interpretation of the statute so clearly imposed on protected
speech that the Court assumed that a somewhat narrower, but less
well defined, compass was intended. 105 In listing the obviously impermissible bases for denial of employment that could fall within
the state statute if literally interpreted, Mr. Justice White offered
an illustration almost identical to that cited by Mr. Justice Douglas
in Elf brandt-the denial of employment to a scholar who "a~e_nds
and participates in an international convention of mathemanc1ans
.
•
•
"106
and exchanges views with scholars from Commumst countnes.
Mr. Justice White's discussion of this and other illustrations clearly
indicated that the state could not deny employment to an individual simply because he unintentionally lent indirect aid to the
"cause" of violent overthrow by engaging in lawful act~vicie~ that
he knew might add to the power of persons supportmg illegal
overthrow. 107 Thus, although the Washington statute, when read
literally, was much broader in scope than the statute in Elfbrandt,
the basic principle expressed in the Baggett opinion clearly would
control Elfbrandt if that case were viewed as concerned primarily
with the application of the Arizona statute to such matters as membership in a Communist-dominated scientific seminar.
While the Court's opinion in Elfbrandt does cite Baggett v.
105 Id. at 366---68. The opinion of the Court does not clearly express the interrel~tionship of the vagueness doctrine and the overbreadth of the statute when it 15
read literally. This point is given more explicit recognition, however, in a subsequent opinion that relied primarily on Baggett. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479, 48~7, 490-92, 493-94 (1965); see also Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378
U.S. 500, 515-16 (1964); United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36
(1963); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 491-92 (1960) (dissenting opinion); Amsterdam, The Void for
Vagueness Doctrine, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
106
107

377 U.S. at 369.

Although the Court's opinion in Baggett raises some question concerning the
nature of the individual's awareness that his acts would aid those seeking overthrow:, the ~pi~i~n also indicates that the activity discussed would be protected
even if the md1v1dual knew "that his aid or teaching would be used by another
and that th': person _aid_ed ~as the requisite guilty intent." The discussion relating
to the possible amb1gmty m the oath's scienter requirement was discu,sed as a
supplementary point. See 377 U.S. at 368-69. See also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479, 492-93. Dcnnbrowski also indicates that the protection afforded by Baggett :vould be eq~allr applicable to the person who is a member of an organization
that. 1~sel~ lends mdrrect and uni'.1tended aid to those supporting overthrow by
f'.art1c1patmg for other purposes m legal activities that will strengthen the posiuon of such groups. Ibid.
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Bullitt in connection with the discussion of the hypotheticals concerning scientific conferences, it does not rely heavily on that decision.108 Both the citation and the hypotheticals seem to serve merely
to supplement the argument for requiring an element of "specific
intent" by presenting an extreme example of what could happen
when a loyalty oath contained no exemption of members who
lacked such intent. The primary emphasis in Elfbrandt is on Scales
and Aptheker, both of which involved membership in the Communist party. 109 Reliance on these decisions, when Baggett was
otherwise sufficient precedent, indicates that the Court's rejection
of employment disqualification based solely on knowing membership in an organization supporting the violent overthrow of the
government extends to all such organizations, including those in
which violent overthrow is a matter of primary emphasis. Garner v.
Board of Public Works must, therefore, be viewed as overruled.
Admittedly, the assumption that the Court overruled an earlier
precedent sub silentio is not to be lightly indulged. But two recent
opinions by Mr. Justice Douglas seem to overrule several other cases
in this manner.U 0 And certainly the thrust of the majority opinion,
as well as the cases cited therein, indicates that Garner was intended
to share the same fate.
Actually, there are a few statements in Elf brandt suggesting that
a statute like that in Garner would be deficient on not one but two
grounds. While Mr. Justice Douglas' several statements of the
Court's ruling in the majority opinion consistently refer only to
the improper disqualification of the knowing member who lacks
"a 'specific intent' to further the illegal aims of the organization,"
a few comments in the opinion suggest that even a statutory restriction on employment limited to members with "specific intent"
would not be valid. For example, in citing the Scales case, Mr.
Justice Douglas noted that the majority there read the Smith Act
"membership clause" to require not only that the member have
the requisite intent but also that he be an "active" member.m At
another point, the opinion might be taken to suggest that even
"active" participation in the group's activities would not be enough
10s

384 U.S. at 16-17.

100 See 367 U.S. at 205-06, 378 U.S. at 504-05

110 See Kurland, supra note 68, at 150, 167-08, discussing Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S.
368 (1963), and Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
111

384 U.S. at 15; sec 367 U.S. at 222-24, 255 n. 29.
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if the activities involved were all legal. Mr. Justice Douglas stated
that those "who join an organization but do not share its unlawful
purposes and who do not participate in its unlawful activities surely
pose no threat to society." 112 While this could be viewed as suggesting alternative requirements, it may indicate that the Court
will not allow employment disqualification to be based on politi~al
association absent a showing of specific intent to promote the violent overthrow of the government plus previous participation in
illegal activities serving that end. Some support for this second
requirement might also be found in Mr. Justice Douglas' statement
that a statute denying employment on the basis of speech-rela~ed
activities must be "narrowly drawn to define and punish spec~c
conduct as constituting a clear and present danger to a substannal
interest of the state." The clear-and-present-danger standard, especially as viewed by Mr. Justice Douglas, could easily be taken to require prior participation in illegal activity.11 3
If these statements do not in themselves impose any additional requirements, they lay the foundation for a future decision to that
effect. 114 Whether the Court's ruling will be expanded to require
active membership or even actual participation in illegal activities
will depend in large part on the precise nature of the considerations
that led the Court to reject Arizona's reliance upon knowing membership as an appropriate basis for denying government employment. The nature of those considerations will also have considerable bearing on whether Elfbrandt will be applied to a statute requiring loyalty oaths of only a limited group of employees, such
as those in sensitive positions. Unfortunately, however, the identification of these relevant considerations is hidden to a large degree
112

384 U.S. at 17.

113

See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 US. 494, 581 (1951) (dissenting
opinion).
114 Th d'
· suggested that the majority did impose a requiree '.ssent at one pomt
ment
of
acttve
membership
C
· h Id"
h
h.
· See 384 US
·· at 22-23·
. "[T]heourterrsmomg
t at t e act is overbroad because it includes state employees who are knowing
members but
·
·
. who .may not be act'1ve an d w ho may lack the specific
mtent
to
further the illegal aims of the Party."
Th~ majority _opini~n, 0 wever, refers to an "active" membershi re uirement
~'.11Y 1~ con;ectwn with Its general description of the Scales case }d a~ 15 The
1scuss10n o Aptheker, the reference to the possible scope of th · t ·
·d h
summary of the Court's rulin at the e d f h
. .
e s atute, an t e
of "specific intent." Jd. at
_
n ° t e opinion speak only of the element
9

?
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by the manner in which the Elf brandt opinion utilized the rule
against overbroadness as the basis for its ruling.

IV.

OVERBROADNESS AND THE NATURE OF THE STATE'S INTERESTS

The rule against overbreadth in legislation affecting First
Amendment rights is a doctrine very much favored by the present
Court. 115 In large part, this is probably due to the fact that it repr~sents one of the few common meeting grounds for the variant
views of the meaning of the First Amendment. 116 But, as one might
expect of a doctrine serving this function, the rule is frequently
used in different ways by different Justices in writing opinions for
the Court. Thus, in some cases, the Court would seem to have
rejected legislation as overbroad primarily because the means employed by the state bore little or no relationship to the interests it
sought to implement. 117 In other cases, the Court has acknowledged
the presence of a substantial relationship, but has still found the
legislation invalid because the state interest could be attained by an
alternative means that would impose less severe restrictions on the
individual's personal liberty.U 8 In still other cases, the Coun seemed
to reject legislation because, whatever the possible alternative
115 See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); N.A.A.C.P. v.
Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307-08 (1964); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-44
(1963); Louisiana v. N.A.A.C.P., 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 62-64 (1960).
116

SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 140-

41 (1966). Compare Justices Douglas' and Black's joining opinion for the Court in
Shelton v. Tucker, supra note 115, with their use of a separate concurring opinion
in Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 527 (1960).
117 See, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, supra note 115; Talley v. California, supra
note 115; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). Frequently, as in Lovell and, perhaps, Talley, there is the further suggestion that the restriction upon speech was
so significant that the statute would not be sustained even if it did bear a relationship to some state interest. In fact, the decisions probably rested on this ground,
since the state's use of an absolute prohibition_ against the distribution of all literature, as in Lovell, or all anonymous handbills, as in Talley, does serve the state's
interest in eliminating obscene or libelous publications in the sense that the flat prohibition against distribution obviously is considerably easier to administer than
one that attempted to specify what literature might fall in the obscene or libelous
category. Cf. Note, The Supreme Court, Jf)Jf) Term, 74 HARV. L. REv. 97, 130

(1960).
118 See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, supra note 115; Shelton v. Tucker,
supra note 115; Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558,562 (1942).
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means, the state interest served by the legislation was deemed insufficient to justify the extensive restriction it imposed upon protected speech or association. 119 While these varying uses of the
"overbroadness" doctrine all rest on the same basic process of evaluating competing interests, the differences in underlying rationale
may be relevant in determining the degree to which the rejection
of legislation as "overbroad" might preclude an attempt to satisfy
the same state interest throuo-h different means. Yet, opinions relying upon the "overbroadnes~" rule often provide no more indication of the Court's analysis than a conclusionary statement that a
particular aspect of the statutory infringement on speech was overly
broad as it applied to the particular interest that the state advanced
in that case. 120 The majority opinion in Elf brandt fits this pattern
and, indeed, is more delinquent, since the Court failed in large part
even to identify the state interest against which the legislation was
balanced.
Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion starts with a description and evaluation of the interest of the individual in joining organizations having both legal and illegal objectives, and, except for one or two
sentences, it never leaves that aspect of the case. Although the
opinion states in conclusion that the Arizona statute "infringes unnecessarily on protected freedoms," it never clearly defines the
state interests in relation to which the infringement was deemed
"unnecessary." 121 The lack of any extended discussion of the state's
interest is not surprising in an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, who
generally seeks to avoid creating any impression that the Court
might be engaged in "balancing" individual rights against a state's
interests. 122 In the area of the legislation involved in Elfbrandt,
119 See, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, supra note 115; Louisiana v. N.A.A.C.P~
supra note 115. See also Shelton v. Tucker, supra note 115, at 493 n. 3 (dissenting

opinion).
120 See, e.g., Louisiana v. N.A.A.C.P., supra note 115; Talley v. California, supra
note 115 .
12
•
~ 384 U.S. at 19. Althou_gh relying upon Aptheker for other purposes, the opinion ignores th: stateme?t m Aptheker that application of the rule against overbroadness reqmres exammation of the state's interest. See Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, supra note 115, at 508.
122c
. ~nsi·der, f or example, his treatment of the state's interest in the following

description of N.A.A.C-:- v. Alab=a and Bates v. Little Rock, as they relate to
the
power
· h a constltu·
·
• al
· h to· compel disclosure of membership lists·• "We d e al wit
tlon ~ig t, smce free~om of association is included in the bundle of First Amendment rights made applicable to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
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however, this omission takes on special significance, since at least
three different state interests are commonly advanced to justify
disqualification of individuals from public employment on the basis
of membership in organizations advocating the violent overthrow
of the government: ( 1) The elimination of persons who present a
potential for sabotage, espionage, or other activities directly injurious to national security. (2) The elimination of persons who are
likely to be either incompetent or untrustworthy in the performance of their duties. ( 3) The elimination of persons who, aside
from any question of danger or fitness, simply are not considered
deserving of a government position because they oppose the basic
principles on which the government is founded. The Elfbrandt
opinion contains no reference to any of these interests aside from
a single ambiguous sentence. In that sentence, Mr. Justice Douglas
emphasized that members who do not share an organization's unlawful purposes and never participate in its unlawful activities
"surely pose no threat, either as citizens or as public employees." 128
The nature of the "threat" to which Mr. Justice Douglas is referring is not entirely clear, but the context of the sentence indicates
that he was probably making reference only to the possibility of
sabotage or similar activities. Since all three state interests were
advanced in justification of the Arizona legislation, however, either
in the briefs or in the opinions below, 124 it must be assumed that
the Court found the statute unnecessarily broad as applied to all
of them. And, as previously noted, the considerations that led the
Court to reject these interests will determine the possibilities for
the extension of the Elfbrandt ruling to loyalty oaths more limited
than Arizona's. 125
teenth Amendment ... [citations omitted]. And where it is shown, as it was in
N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, supra, 462-463, that disclosure of membership lists results
in reprisals against and hostility to the members, disclosure is not required. And
see Bates v. Little Rock, supra, 523-524." Louisiana v. N.A.A.C.P., supra note 115,
at 296.
12s 384 U.S. at 17.
124 Although the respondent's brief placed emphasis upon the first of the state
interests mentioned above, the opinion of the lower court made reference to the
other two. See Brief for Respondent, pp. 8, 13; 94 Ariz. at 6, 10-11._ See also the
Report of the Arizona Judiciary Committee in Support of the Committee Amendment to H.B. 115, reproduced as Appendix Bin Respondent's brief.
125 Of course, even if the opinion had clearly identified the state's interest and
explained why the statute was overbroad in relation to those interests, the Court
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THE DENIAL OF SUPPORT To D1sLOYAL GROUPS

It has frequently been argued that persons who lack ".fidelity
to the very presuppositions of our scheme of government" should
be denied public employment simply because the government need
not support those who oppose it. 126 Taxpayers' funds," so the
argument goes, "should not be spent to support ... a person of
doubtful loyalty to the very governmental system f ?r which he
wants to work." 127 Or, to look at it from the other side, the state
should be allowed to promote loyalty to our basic institutions by
128
employing only those who accept those institutions.
Although this argument probably serves as the primary basis for
much of our "loyalty" legislation, 129 the state interest it advan~es
has not always been recognized as separate from that of excluding
need not have committed itself on the weight of those interests in the case of a
modified statute. See Karst, The First Amendment and Harry Kalven: An Appreciative Comment on the Advantages of Thinking Small, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1,
15-17 (1965). Yet that would be the inevitable result of reliance upon several of
the possible grounds for judgment that are discussed in the next three sections of
this article.
126 Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 725 (1951) (concurring opinion). See BROWN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 205, 333, 335, 337; Linde, Justice Douglas
on Freedom in the Welfare State, 39 WASH, L. REv. 39 (1964) (both noting the
argument, but not supporting it).
127 Linde, supra note 126, at 39. As used in this argument, "disloyalty" means
only the denial of the basic premises on which the government is founded. In the
case of persons believing in violent overthrow, it is the denial of the premise that
change m go~e~ent can take place only through the democratic means provided
by the Const1tut1on. See BROWN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 6-7, 389.
Another concept of loyalty sometimes advanced in connection with this argument rests on the. individual's alleged subservience to a foreign nation. See, e.g.,
Aruz. RE~. STAT., tlt. 16, ch. 2, § 16-205 (1965 Supp.) (Arizona Communist Control
Act). This concept, ho~ever, does not relate to all groups advocating overthrow
of ~e government, and It has been employed primarily in connection with Commurust Control Acts. It could provide an entirely separate basis for denial of support through ~mployment disqualification. See People v. Crane, 124 N.Y. 154, 161,
164 _(1915), aff d, 239 U.S. 195 (1915). But it would present essentially the same difficulties as Elfbrand~ with respect to the need for a showing that the individual member owed his allegiance to a foreign country.
128
Cf. First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles 48 Cal 2d 419 438-39
(1957), rev'd, 357 U.S. 545 (1958).
'
·
'
Sp12oi-ee W4/lclcox, Invasions of the First Amendment through Conditioned Public
en mg,
ORNELL L.Q. 12, 48 (1955) · Linde supra
cit supra note 5, at 337, 340,
'
'
note 126, at 39; BROWN, op.
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potentially unreliable and incompetent employees. The two interests do often overlap, but they are distinct in one important respect.130 The state's interest in obtaining fit employees relates to
the individual's potential performance in public employment, while
its interest in denying support to "disloyal" persons may relate
only to the individual's attitude toward basic principles of constitutional government. 131 Thus, associational ties that might not be
adequate to establish the likelihood that a person will act improperly in office may nevertheless be sufficient to show a lack of "loyalty," for example, in the individual's acceptance of a general theory
that the violent overthrow of government is preferable to the constitutional processes for change provided in the Constitution.
The Court in Elf brandt obviously found that the state interest
in denying support to "disloyal" persons could not justify the Arizona loyalty oath. That conclusion may have been based on at least
two distinct approaches, each furnishing somewhat different implications of the future effect of the decision. On the more limited
approach, the Court may have agreed that the state has an interest
in denying support to "disloyal" persons but still have found that
the Arizona statute was not sufficiently related to that interest.
Since, under the state's theory, the basis for denial of employment
turns on the individual's rejection of the basic principles of constitutional government, the loyalty oath, to implement that theory,
logically should exclude only those members who themselves subscribe to the illegal objective of violent overthrow. 132 The Arizona
statute, as related to this state interest, could very properly be
described as unnecessarily broad. A ruling based on this analysis
would go no further than to require that the element of "specific
intent" be added to the "membership clause" of § 5. The addition
of an clement of active participation in the organization's affairs
would not be needed, since, as noted, "disloyalty" for the purpose
of this theory need not be related to action.
180 See BROWN, supra note 5, at 205. See also 94 Ariz. at 6, 10--11.
181 See note 127 supra. See also Sacks, Federal Civilian Employees Security

Program: An Analysis of the Wright Commission Report, 52 Nw. U. L. REv. 715, 719
(1958).
132 The Coun adopted a similar view in interpreting the requirement of "attachment to the principles of the constitution" under the Nationality Act of 1906. See
Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660 (1958); Maisenberg v. United States, 356 U.S.
670 (1958).
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This analysis would not in itself answer the argument, suggested
by the dissent, that the individual by lending "his name and influence" to the organization automatically aided its illegal objectives, whatever his intent, and that the state could, therefore, exclude him from employment as a means of denying support to a
"disloyal" organization. 133 On this point, the Court would be required to answer that the state's justification for a loyalty oath must
relate directly to the denial of support to the individual, rather than
to the organization, since it is the individual who suffers the brunt
of the restriction. Some support for this position may be found in
Wieman v. Updegraff,1 34 where the Court held that the state co~ld
not deny employment to members of organizations advocatmg
overthrow who were not aware that the organization had this objective. Certainly, a member in that category could give the organization as much aid by lending it "his name and influence" as the
k nowmg
. member w h o d"d
· · ' s purpose. 135
i not sh are t he organization
While there is a significant difference in the fact that the member
in the second case has knowledge of the organization's illegal goals,
Baggett v. Bullitt indicates that, at least in the case of somewhat
more indirect assistance such as united activity in support of a
joint political objective, it matters not that the individual realizes
that his assistance will indirectly further the organization's illegal
objectives. 136 Membership in an organization actually advocating
overthrow may, of course, constitute a much more direct contribution to its illegal objectives. But when the importance Wieman
attached to freedom of association is also considered, the Court
might well conclude that the state's interest in shutting off this
additional element of organizational support was insufficient to outweigh the restriction on individual freedom. In sum then, under
this first approach, the Arizona oath would be rejected because
(I) the s:ate's interest in denying support to "disloyal" persons is
not sufficient so long as the individual does not himself subscribe
133

384 U.S. at 20. This argument was also suggested in the Arizona Supreme
Court. See 94 Ariz. at 10-11.
1 s4

344 U.S. 183 (1952).

135

!h~ Court h~ recognized that an individual can be an active member of an
orgaruzanon and still not .be aware of its illega1 ob'Jecnve.
·
see N owak v. U rute
· d
S
~~~ :::\~~;;~berg v. United States, supra note 132; cf. Rowoldt v.

p::~~t'.t:,'t;;
1 86 See

text at note 107 supra.
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to an organization's illegal goals, and (2) the state's interest in denying the organization whatever support comes from the membership of a person who does not favor its illegal ends is not sufficient
to justify restricting that individual's right to join that organization
in order to work for a legal objective he does favor.
A second and more far-reaching approach to both aspects of this
problem would hold that the state's interest in denying support to
"disloyal" persons or organizations is never a proper basis for employment disqualification, except possibly where the grounds of disqualification are limited to speech or association that could be directly
proscribed under the Constimtion. At the outset, it should be noted
that the Court never has had occasion directly to accept or reject
the principle that a state can base a loyalty test on its desire to
deny employment to those persons who reject the basic principles
of constitutional government. Scattered statements in one or two
opinions might be taken as recognizing the state's interest in this
regard, but these opinions dealt primarily with other state goals. 137
Moreover, these opinions were written before Speiser v. Randall. 138
187 See Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 725 (1951) (concurring
opinion); Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 492-93 (1952). The statements in Adler are ambiguous because the Court never defines the term "loyalty"
when it speaks of determining "fitness and loyalty." Moreover, the various statements in Adler emphasizing the so-called privilege rationale were sharply limited
only a year later in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1953).
188 357 U.S. 513 (1958). One post-Speiser statement that could be bracketed with
the cases cited in note 137 is found in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
The Court there sustained a statutory provision disqualifying from social security
benefits persons who "had been deported on several grounds, including membership in the Communist Party." The Court noted that a rational justification
for the statute might rest on th~ deportee's inability to aid the domestic economy
by spending the benefits locally. The opinion then went on to make the following
statements: "For these purposes, it is, of course, constitutionally irrelevant whether
this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision, as it is irrelevant that the
section does not extend to all to whom the postulated rationale might in logic apply .
. . . Nor, apart from this, can it be deemed irrational for Congress to have concluded that the public purse should not be utilized to contribute to the support
of those deported on the grounds specified in the statute."
It is not entirely clear whether the last sentence refers to the fact that the deportee
would be residing abroad or whether it establishes a right to deny support simply
because alien Communists are not "deserving" of benefits. See Linde, supra note
126, at 17, suggesting the latter interpretation. In any event, subsequent cases, apparently viewing Flemming as based entirely on the first rationale, have treated
Speiser and Flemming as consistent in the general principle each applied. See, e.g.,
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-05, 409 n. 9 (1963).
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In Speiser the Court held unconstitutional a California statute
requiring every applicant for a veteran's tax exemption to swear
that he was not presently advocating the violent overthrow of the
federal or state government. The California statute was based on
essentially the same state interest as is advanced to deny employment to "disloyal" persons. It was designed to "encourage . • • loyalty to our institutions" by denying support of persons wh~ advocated the violent overthrow of those institutions. 139 Unlike the
Arizona loyalty oath, however, the standard for denial of benefits
was limited to speech that had been held to be outside the protection of the First Amendment. 140 The Court, therefore, did not have
to deal directly with the question whether the denial of tax benefits
could have been based on speech that could not be directly prohibited under the Constitution. Nevertheless, the Court's opinion
indicated quite clearly that if such exemptions can be denied on the
basis of speech at all, it must be on the basis of "proscribed speech
141
for which [the individual] might be fined or imprisoned."
In
particular, the opinion emphasized that legislation serving the function of the California statute constituted a direct restraint on speech,
since it was "frankly aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas,"
rather than the control of particular conduct relating to the benefit
granted.14 2 The Court carefully distinguished prior loyalty oath
cases, such as Gerende, on the ground that the "principal aim of
those statutes was not to penalize political beliefs but to deny Positions to persons supposed to be dangerous because the position
might be misused to the detriment of the public." 143 Finally, the
Court, relying in part on Wieman v. Updegraff, rejected the argument that tax exemptions constituted a privilege and therefore were
not subject to constitutional limitations upon the infringement of
speech.144
In, li?ht of Sfeiser, a loyalty oath justified solely in terms of the
states _mterest _m _denY:ing support to "disloyal" persons, as opposed
to an mterest m msurmg employee reliability, must be viewed as a
189
357 U.S. at 527. See also statement of Clark J. dissenting: "The interest of
the State • • ·. is dual In n ature, but Its
· primarv
·
' ' Is
· summed up m
· an underthrust
standable desire to insure that those who be~efit by tax exemption do not bite
the hand that gives it." Id. at 543.
0

140

Id. at 519-20.

UlJd,at 520.

142

Id. at 519.

143

Id. at 527.

144

Id. at 518-19.
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direct restraint on speech. It follows that the only permissible standard for an oath serving that interest would be one tied, as in Speiser,
to speech or association that might generally be made criminal under such legislation as the Smith Act.14 5 Moreover, even if the
standard employed were to meet the requirements of the Scales
case, for example, there still might be some question about its validity when used in the context of a loyalty oath. Speiser only assumed
arguendo that a state could deny benefits solely on "disloyalty"
grounds where the speech involved was directly punishable.146 The
opinion then went on to reject the California statute because, in
any event, it improperly shifted the burden of proof. In reaching
this result, Speiser compared the California provision to a statute
imposing a penalty for a crime.147 Extending this reasoning, the
Court might well rule, if forced to meet the issue, that a loyalty
requirement "frankly aimed at suppressing speech," even if limited to constitutionally prohibitible speech, would still be invalid
because it fails to afford the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment. 148
This would, in effect, reject any state employment test designed
as a means of denying suppon to "disloyal" persons or organizations unless the standards under that test were relevant also to the
quality of the employee's performance on the job.
Even if Speiser is not extended to its logical extreme, its application to the area of government employment still presents the
problem of distinguishing ( or rejecting) two "practical" precedents
that are often cited to justify loyalty qualifications for government
employees. The first is the traditional practice of hiring and firing
under the spoils system that was so prevalent in this country before
the advent of civil service (and is still not unheard of today). 149
If Republicans can deny employment to Democrats simply because
they are Democrats, why not, it is asked, permit both parties to
exclude persons who believe in the overthrow of the government?
145 See Thompson v. Gleason, 317 F.2d 901, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1952); cf. Danskin
v. School Board, 28 Cal.2d 536 (1946); United States v. Schneider, 45 F. Supp. 848
(ED. Wisc.1942).
146

357 U.S. at 519-20.

147

Id. at 525, citing Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922).

148 Cf. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 184 n. 39 (1963) (relying
on Lipke v. Lederer, supra note 147).
149 See Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 59-60, 62-63 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by
equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (collecting sources).

180

JEROLD H. lSRAEL

A possible answer could be that the spoils system was basically a
product of a different era in which the characterization of employ150
ment as a privilege carried far more weight than it does today.
But the better answer is that the patronage system of ~mployme~t
has operated behind the Court's general refusal to examme the basis
of the government's employment decisions unless the grounds for
those decisions are clearly announced. 151 If the basic premise of
the spoils system, insofar as it is not related to fitness, were clearly
stated in statute or regulation, it would be rejected as arbitrary.
This point seems clear from United Public Workers v. Mitchell,
where the Court noted that "none would deny" that "Congress
may not enact a regulation providing that no Republican, Jew, or
Negro shall be appointed to federal office." 152
The second precedent relied upon is the general requirement
that government employees take an oath swearing to "bear true
faith and allegiance" to the government, to "support and defend
the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic," and to
"faithfully discharge the duties of [public] office." 153 An "affirmative" oath of this nature has been required of federal employees in
the executive branch since 1884, 154 and a somewhat similar oath
is required of the President by Article II of the Constitution. The
contents of the oath, particularly the general requirement of defense of the Constitution, seems to indicate that it extends to matters beyond the individual's performance in office. Accordingly, it
is argued that a requirement that employees believe in democratic
processes for change, as opposed to violent overthrow, merely
restates in a more specific fashion the employee's affirmative duty
to defend the Constitution and to bear true allegiance to the government formed under the Constitution.155 The short answer here
150 See generally Willcox, supra note 129, at 12-15, 37-44. Campare Heim v.
McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 191 (1915), with Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192
(1952). See also Powell, The Right To Work for the State, 16 CoLUM. L. REv. 99
(1916).
151 See, e.g., Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961).
152

330 U.S. at 100.

153

5 U.S.C. § 16 (1964). See Constanzo, Loyalty Oath Affidavit, 37 U. DET. L.
718, 728 (1960); Willcox, supra note 129, at 49.
15 4

J.

See 5 U.S.C. § 16 (1964); 23 Stat. 22 (1884).

155 _The

fact that the affirmative_ oaths refer to future conduct and therefore would
not likely be enforced by a perJuty prosecution would not in itself serve as an
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is that the affirmative oath of allegiance refers only to positive acts
in violation of a constitutionally imposed legal duty. In In re Summers,156 for example, the Court, in finding that a person unwilling
to bear arms could not conscientiously take the oath to "support
the Constitution," specifically rested its conclusion on the assumption that the draft exemption for conscientious objectors was not
constitutionally required and that the failure of a conscientious
objector to bear arms could validly be made a crime. Similarly,
the affirmative oath, if it applies to speech at all, creates a duty to
abstain only from such seditious speech or association as could be
directly prohibited consistent with the Constitution. This would
be entirely consistent with at least the more limited view of Speiser
'V. Randall as restricting the basis for the denial of benefits "to
proscribed speech for which [the individual] might be imprisoned
or fined." 157
As previously noted, the Court's opinion in Elfbrandt does not
clearly indicate why it found the state's interest in denying support to "disloyal" persons insufficient to justify the Arizona loyalty
oath. The Court probably did not advance beyond the first approach suggested above, that membership without specific intent
to further illegal objectives bore an insufficient relationship to the
state interest. The more broadly based ground would have required
a discussion of Speiser, and that case was cited only once and for
a different point. 158 On the other hand, four members of the Elfbrandt majority had previously urged a very broad interpretation
adequate basis for distinguishing the loyalty oath. See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
360, 374 (1964): "Without the criminal sanctions, it is said, one need not fear
taking this oath. . •• This contention ignores not only the effect of the oath on
those who will not solemnly swear unless they can do so honestly and without
prevarication and reservation, but also its effect on those who believe the written
law means what it says."
156 325 U.S. 561, 569-73 (1945). Summers involved the duty to support the
state constitution (Illinois), but, at that time, a similar construction had been placed
upon the requirement of suppon of the federal constitution in the oath of allegiance
required by the Naturalization Act of 1906. See United States v. Schwimmer,
279 U.S. 644 (1929); United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931), overruled
by Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1945). The Girouard case found that
Congress had not intended to make willingness to bear arms an absolute prerequisite
to citizenship.

157 See

note 141 supra.

ns 384 U.S. at 17-18.
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of Speiser in another context. 159 Perhaps they viewed Speiser as so
clearly rejecting this interest that no discussion was necessary. If
this is true, Elf brandt will have bearing beyond the employment
situation and may, along with Speiser, provide the basis for rejecting such loyalty restrictions as that imposed under the recent Medicare legislation. 160

VI.

THE STATE'S INTEREST IN INSURING THE FITNESS

OF

ITs

EMPLOYEES

The ruling in Elf brandt indicates also that the Arizona oath
requirement could not be sustained by the state's interest in insuring the fitness of its employees. Here again the significance of the
decision will depend in large degree on which of two somewhat
different rationales led the Court to this conclusion.
The first rationale would be based primarily on the total coverage
of the Arizona statute. Although petitioner in Elf brandt happened
to be a teacher, the Arizona oath was required of all state and local
employees, including janitors, street cleaners, and others with purely ministerial functions. 161 As applied to persons in these positions,
the case for determining the prospective employee's potential performance on the basis of his membership in an organization advocating overthrow is very weak. The traditional argument for denying
state employment to members of such organizations has rested on
the likelihood that they would use their positions to strengthen the
organization's ability eventually to attempt violent overthrow by
( 1) promoting the organization's influence through favoritism in
the distribution of governmental benefits to those groups sympa159 See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 75-80, 80-81 (1961) (dissenting opinions). See also the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice
Black, in Speiser. 357 U.S. at 532, 535-38.
160 See 79 Stat. 333 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 427 (note) (Supp. 1965). This section
generally extends hospital benefits to persons not insured under Social Security
or Railroad Retirement, but makes an exception for a member of any organization
order:d ?Y the Subversive Activities Control Board to register as a Communist
o~gan'.zat1on under the Internal Security Act of 1950. See also the various provisions
cited m Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1595, 1601--02 (1960),
161
ARiz. REv. STAT.§ 38-231 (B), (C) (1965). The Arizona oath was required
of '.'any person elected, appointed or employed, either on a part-time or full-time
basis_ ~y the state or any of its political subdivisions or any county, city, town,
muruc'.p~l corporation, school district, public educational institution, or any board,
commiss10n or agency of any of the foregoing." Ibid.
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thetic to the organization's goals and (2) using government power
to achieve social and economic conditions that are prerequisit~s to a
successful attempt at revolution. 162 Typical examples offered in support of this position are the employees of legislative committees who
attempted "to manipulate hearings so as to favor the friends of the
party and depreciate its enemies," 163 and the public school teachers
who used their position to indoctrinate students through the teaching of "a prescribed party line." 164 While the Court has previously
accepted the state's interest in preventing such misuse of office as an
appropriate basis for imposing loyalty restrictions on teachers 165 and
lawyers, 166 it would seriously strain this reasoning to sustain restrictions upon numerous positions that do not allow the employee sufficient discretion to permit any significant manipulation to benefit the
organization. Nevertheless, the strained reasoning has been offered
in several arguments supporting the application of loyalty tests to all
government positions.
One such argument defends total coverage on the ground that it
162 See SELZNICK, THE ORGANIZATIONAL WEAPON 215-24 (1960); BROWN, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 215-18, 336---38. A special danger frequently mentioned in connection with employment of Communist party members is their tendency "to influence
specific [policy] decisions, especially on matters of less than central interest to the
target government which may help a communist faction abroad or may increase
vulnerability to Soviet diplomacy." SELZNICK, at 220. This possibility presents basically the same type of problems in devising an appropriate scope for loyalty oath
requirements as the two types of misuse of position mentioned in the text.
1 63

SELZNICK, op. cit. supra note 162, at 222, citing statements by former Senator

R. M. La Follette, Jr., concerning the activities of "pro-communist elements" on the
staffs of congressional committees.
1 64 N.Y. Laws 1949, c. 360 (legislative findings supporting the Feinberg Law).
See also HooK, HERESY YES-CONSPIRACY No 184-87 (1953); THOMAS, THE TEST OF
FREEDOM 90-93 (1954).

165 Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 489-93 (1951). See also Beilan v.
Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
166 Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961). Although the primary issue before
the Court in the second Konigsberg case concerned the state's power to compel a
bar applicant to answer an inquiry concerning membership in the Communist party,
the Court did indicate that the standard for disqualification to which the inquiry
related-advocacy of violent overthrow-was constitutionally valid. See id. at 5152: "It would indeed be difficult to argue that a belief firm enough to be carried into
advocacy, in the use of illegal means to change the form of the State or Federal
government is an unimportant consideration in determining the fitness of applicants
for membership in a profession in whose hands so largely lies the safekeeping of
this country's legal and political institutions."
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is not administratively feasible to identify those positions in which
the opportunity for misuse of office in favor of organizational objectives is either nonexistent or negligible. 167 This is a difficult position
to sustain in the light of the ability of the federal government, for
example, to distinguish between sensitive and non-sensitive positions
under the employee security program and between discretionary
168
and ministerial functions under the Federal Torts Claims Act.
Also, it seems particularly unlikely to appeal to a Court that itself
has undertaken the task of distinguishing between different state
positions in order to determine which persons are "public officials"
169
for the purpose of the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan rule.
Another argument favoring total coverage rests on the thesis that
the employment of members of groups advocating overthrow, no
matter what the individual's position, will give the govern~ent
service a bad public image and therefore impair its general effecn~eness. Assuming that such public reaction is a reality,110 decisions bke
Wieman v. Updegraff 171 would seem to foreclose its use for imposing a restriction upon constitutionally protected association. Although Wieman deals with the member of an organization who is
unaware of its illegal objectives and Elf brandt with the knowing
member who merely does not support those objectives, the difference in the two is unlikely to be significant insofar as public reaction
to employment of such persons is concerned. Except in unusual
cases, the member's lack of awareness of the organization's objectives is unlikely to be a matter of public knowledge, and where it is,
it will often be disbelieved. 172 Similarly, although Wieman, unlike
167 Cf. Brief for Respondent, pp. 36-43, 56-60; Garner v. Board of Public Works,
341 U.S. 716 (1951).
168 See Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15
(1953). This is not to say that either of these distinctions is satisfactory for determining which positions might easily be misused to support organizational objectives, bu: only to suggest that the process of classifying government jobs for this
purpose is_ no more difficult than drawing the distinctions required under the Federal Security program or the Federal Torts Claim Act.
1 69

See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).

170

See STOUFFER, COMMUNISM, CONFORMITY AND CIVIL

171

344 U.S. 183 (1952).

172 See

LIBERTIES

39-45 (1955),

generally Mowitz, Michigan-State and Local Attack on Subversion, in
THE ~TATES AND SUBVERSION 184, 206-15, 228-30 (1952) (Gellhorn ed.); STOUFFER,
op. cit. supra note 170, at 39.
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Elf brandt, concerned membership in "front" organizations as well
as those directly advocating overthrow, the Court has clearly indicated that the ruling there is applicable to members of either type of
organization. 173 The negative impact upon free association is, of
course, presumably less in Elf brandt than in Wieman because the
Arizona statute does include the element of "scienter." Yet this difference hardly seems likely to alter what might well be viewed in
Wieman as a total rejection of public reaction as a factor that may
be used in determining employment qualifications. 174 Adverse public
reaction may justify otherwise irrational government action in other
areas, 175 but the Court is not willing to give such reaction any
weight where it would affect the exercise of a constitutionally protected right. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated in his separate opinion in Garner:116 "[S]urely a government could not exclude from
public employment members of a minority group merely because
they are odious to the majority." This seems equally true whether
the minority is defined in terms of race, religion, or politics.
Finally, the Court in Garner sustained the total coverage of a
loyalty oath requirement on the ground that membership in a group
such as the Communist party might be viewed as likely to affect the
individual's performance in all government positions, "both high
and low." 177 Unfortunately, the Court's opinion concentrated primarily on other issues and offered little explanation of its conclusion on this point. 178 The opinion does suggest that the Court viewed
173 See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 510 (1964); Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957); see also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234, 247-48 (1957).
1 74 344 U.S. at 190--91; see also id. at 194-97 (concurring opinion). Although the
Court did not specifically mention the possible impact upon the public image of
government service, the opinion clearly recognized the community attitude about
persons discharged on loyalty grounds and emphasized that there was no state
interest that justified imposing that burden on the "innocent" member. Id. at 191.
175 Cf. NEWSWEEK, supra note 2 (improper sexual activities); Scott v. Macy, 349
F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir.1965).
176
1 7s

341 U.S. at 724.

111

Id. at 720.

The Court devoted only two paragraphs to this issue, the first dealing primarily
with the state's power to require that employees disclose by affidavit any past membership in the Communist party: "We think that a municipal employer is not disabled because it is an agency of the State from inquiring of its employees as to
matters that may prove relevant to their fitness and suitability for the public service. Past conduct may well relate to present fitness; past loyalty may have a reasonable relationship to present and future crust. Both are commonly inquired into
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the individual's willingness to support illegal overthrow of the government as a reasonable indication of a general lack of "integrity."
It also has been suggested that members of such organizations tend
to be inefficient and easily disgruntled employees because of the~
strong opposition to the government for which they work. 179 A~d1tionally, their intense psychological involvement in the org_aruzation's "cause" allegedly makes them less able to devote their full
efforts to their work. 180 All these points have relevance, however,
only to the person who is deeply involved with the organization's
purpose. Although there are obviously some hard core members
("cadres") of whom it may be true, 181 certainly membership ~it_h
knowledge of the organization's illegal purpose would hardly md1cate in itself that the individual falls in that category. 182 Accordingly, even if the Court gave full recognition to this argument, it could
still reject a loyalty requirement applicable to all knowing m mbers
7
of an organization advocating overthrow irrespective of their purpose in joining the organization or their degree of participation in
the organization's activities. 183
in determining fitness for both high and low positions in private industry and are
not less relevant in public employment. The affidavit requirement is valid.
"2. In our view the validity of the oath turns upon the nature of the Charter
amendment (1941) and the relation of the ordinance (1948) to this amendment.•• •
We assume that under the Federal Constitution the Charter amendment is valid
to the extent that it bars from the city's public service persons who, subsequent
to its adoption in 1941, advise, advocate, or teach the violent overthrow of the
Government or who are or become affiliated with any group doing so. The provisions operating thus prospectively were a reasonable regulation to protect the
municipal service by establishing an employment qualification of loyalty to the
State and the United States. Cf. Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341
U.S. 56 (1951) . Likewise, as a regulation of political activity of municipal employees,
the amendment was reasonably designed to protect the integrity and competency
of the service. This Court has held that Congress may reasonably restrict the political activity of federal civil service employees for such a purpose, United Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 102-103 (1947), and a State is not without power
to do as much." 341 U.S. at 720-21.
179

BROWN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 336-37; ALMOND, THE APPEALS OF COMMUNISM

103, 260-62 (1954).
180

BROWN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 337; ALMOND, op. cit. supra note 179, at 258-59 .

181

MEYER, THE MouLDING OF CoMMUNISTS 132-52, 161-65 (1961); ALMOND, op.
cit. supra note 179, at 232-33.
•

182

SELZNICK, op. cit. supra note 162, at 83-85; MEYER, op. cit. supra note 181, at

105-31.
183

In Garne~, the tot~! covera~e of the Los Angeles oath was emphasized only in
the ACLU brief as am1cus curiae, p. 8. Respondent's reply simply brushed over
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The Court's rejection of the state's interest in insuring employee
fimess thus could have been based, in large part, upon the total
coverage of the Arizona oath. Yet, although Mr. Justice Douglas
does not in any sense reject this as the ground for decision, it seems
likely that the Elf brandt decision was intended to have a much
greater reach. While the opinion does note that the Arizona statute
applies to all employees, it places no emphasis on this factor. 184
On the other hand, the point on which Mr. Justice Douglas placed
the greatest stress, the denial of employment to members lacking
"specific intent," would seem to have significance no matter what
the coverage of the statute. Thus, although it is far from clear, the
opinion indicates that the Court would have reached the same conclusion had the Arizona oath been limited to employees, such as
teachers, whose jobs were clearly capable of being manipulated to
serve the interests of an organization advocating violent overthrow.
If that is true, the Court's ruling is of considerably more significance,
from a doctrinal as well as a practical viewpoint.
On a test oath limited to employees with discretionary authority,
the state's argument for the exclusion of all knowing members of an
organization advocating violent overthrow would rest essentially on
the recognized tendency of these organizations to "promote" the
"misuse" of such authority. As the Court at one time recognized in
a related context, even members of such organizations who have no
interest in promoting the overthrow of the government may be induced to misuse public power to achieve organizational objectives. 185
Thus, it has been suggested that teachers belonging to the Communist party will use their classes to advance the party line, not because they necessarily believe in overthrow, but because they bethis objection as an administrative matter on which the state's judgment must be
respected. Respondent's brief, p. 66. Other than this the briefs concentrated almost
entirely on the bill of attainder argument. Very little attention was given to the
membership clause, and there was no mention of the absence of a requirement of
specific intent to support the organization's illegal objective.
184 384 U.S. at 12. The Court mentioned the total coverage only in the general
description of the facts of the case.
185 See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 387-89 (1950).
The Taft-Hartley provision sustained in Douds extended to all members of the
Communist party, irrespective of the individual's attitude toward its illegal objectives. Of course, Douds has been undercut to a great extent by United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), and though Brown rejects the Douds analysis primarily on other points, the opinion there suggests that the Court also would reject
this aspect of the Douds reasoning. See id. at 455-56.
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lieve in the legal objectives of the party and because the party strongly urges its members to engage in this activity as a means of achieving those objectives. 186 The statute in Elf brandt was not, of course,
limited in application to the Communist party, but the manipulation of public offices in the manner previously described would be
an essential ingredient of the program of any organization that
hoped to overthrow the government. In sum, the argument would
be that even members who do not subscribe to the organization's
illegal ends pose a danger because ( 1) the organization imposes
great pressure on its members to build group strength through the
employee's manipulation of discretionary authority, and (2) the
nature of the manipulation is sufficiently related to the group's
legal objectives to encourage participation by members who favor
only those objectives. The first factor, the constant stress on manipulation, also serves to distinguish the state's regulation here from
the possibly unconstitutional denial of employment to members
of other groups that might profit by manipulation of public power.
Thus, it provides the answer to the argument that the exclusion of
Communist teachers logically would also permit the exclusion of
Catholic clergy teaching in public schools because they too engaged in classroom indoctrination.187 Although members of some
other groups may occasionally misuse their public position to aid
the group, only organizations advocating overthrow have actively
promoted such activity, as logically they must if they are to achieve
their basic goal. 188
The opinion in Elf brandt does not clearly indicate whether the
Court considered this argument or, if so, on what grounds it rejected
it. Certainly, the majority's reliance on the prohibition against
"guilt by association" would not be an adequate ground. The denial
of employment to all knowing members does not rest on a "conclusive presumption that the member shares the unlawful aims of
the organization," 189 but rather on the potential danger presented
186 See generally HooK, op. cit. supra note 164, at 181-86; BRoWN, op. cit. supra
note 5, at 340--41.
187 See Zeller v. Huff, 236 P.2d 949 (N.M. 1951); see also HooK, op. cit. supra
note 164, at 219-20.
188 HooK, op. cit. supra note 164, at 219-20; see also SELZNICK, op. cit. supra note
162, at 221-24.
181l

384 U.S. at 17.
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by the member even when he does not share these aims. In fact,
the Court's reliance on this argument might well indicate that it
did not appreciate the state's position in this regard.
On the other hand, the Court relied heavily on Aptheker v.
Secretary of State,1 90 which does provide an adequate basis for rejecting the state's argument. In Aptheker the Court held unconstitutional a section of the Securities Activities Control Act that made
it a crime for any member of an organization found to be a "communist organization" to seek a United States passport. 191 The congressional purpose in enacting this provision had been to prevent
travel abroad that could further the organization's relationship with
the "world Communist movement" through the exchange of secret
communiques, the training of local leaders, and similar activities. 192
The Court majority there, including four members of the Elf brandt
majority,1 93 held the statute unconstitutional because, as in Elfbrandt, the legislature had sought to achieve its objective "by means
that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedom." 194 The unnecessary breadth came from Congress' failure to take into consideration several factors that were
considered relevant to "the likelihood that travel by such a person
would be attended by the type of activity which Congress sought
to control." 195 The Court particularly emphasized that the statute
automatically denied the member's right to travel without regard
to his knowledge of the organization's improper purpose, "his commitment to its purpose," "his degree of activity in the organization,"
his "purposes" for wishing to travel, and "the security-sensitivity
of the areas in which he wishes to travel." 196
Despite certain differences, a strong analogy can be drawn between Aptheker and Elfbrandt. Although the holding in Aptheker
was framed in terms of the Fifth Amendment right to travel,1 97
various references in the opinion indicate that the decision was
190

378 U.S. 500 (1964).

191

64 Stat. 993, 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1964).

192

378 U.S. at 526-27 (dissenting opinion).

The Chief Justice and Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan. Mr. Justice
Fortas, the fifth member of the Elfbrandt majority, was not then a member of the
Court.
193

194

378 U.S. at 508, quoting from N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288,307 (1964).

195

378 U.S. at 510.

rna Jd. at 510, 512.

197 Jd.

at 505-07, 514, 517.
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grounded on the restriction upon free association. The Court relied
in large part on First Amendment cases, 198 and specifically analogized the restrictions on the issuance of passports to loyalty restrictions on government employment. 199 Also, although the legislation
extended to "Communist front" organizations and therefore included groups in which a large majority of members were unlikely
to be aligned with the "world Communist movement," 200 the
Court's opinion did not refer to this fact, and it made no effort to
distinguish between members of "Communist front" and "Communist action" organizations. Thus, despite Mr. Justice White's
objection that "Aptheker did not deal with the government employee,"201 the ruling in Aptheker clearly was entitled to significant
consideration in determining the validity of an employment test
imposing a similar type of restriction upon the individual's right of
association.
Mr. Justice White also distinguished Aptheker on the ground
that the statute involved there applied to members who were unaware of the organization's ties to the "world Communist movement."202 The Aptheker opinion indicates, however, that the addition of this element of knowledge would not have altered the result
in that case. The opinion placed great stress on the legislature's
failure to consider the individual's "activity, commitment, and purpose in the places for travel." 203 Perhaps, the Court's reliance upon
one of these factors, the member's commitment to the organization's
purposes, could be distinguished in the situation presented by Elfbrandt. Unlike the prospect of manipulation of public office, the
activities that Congress sought to inhibit in the passport legislation
198

See, e.g., id. at 517, 525; see also Note, 78

199

378 U.S. at 508, 510, 513-14.

HARV.

L. REv. 143, 195-99 (1964),

20 Communist front organizations are those (1) "substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by a Communist action organization," and (2) "primarily
operated for the purpose of giving aid and support to a Communist-action organization.,, or the world Communist movement." 64 Stat. 989, 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1964).
See American Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born v. S.A.C.B.,
331 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1962), vacated, 380 U.S. 503,505 (1965).
201 384 U.S. at 22.
20 2 Ibid.

°

203

Id. ~t 514. "1!'1- ~d?ition to the absence of criteria linking the bare fact of
membership to t?e mdiv'.dual'~ knowledge, activity or commitment, § 6 also excludes
other considerat10ns which might more closely relate the denial of passports to the
stated purpose of the legislation." Id. at 511.
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would be undertaken only by members who shared the organization's goal of promoting the "world Communist movement." But
the stress that Aptheker places on the other factors of activity and
purpose of travel, especially when viewed in the light of the administrative burdens involved in considering those factors, 204 suggests a general policy, equally applicable to Elfbrandt, against the
use of knowing membership as an indicator of an individual's tendency to act improperly on behalf of an organization. Surely, if this
policy required legislative consideration of so many factors beyond
the element of scienter in Aptheker, it could easily make similar
demands of Arizona.
Reliance upon Aptheker becomes more difficult, however, if
Elf brandt is viewed as establishing a standard that would be applicable to a loyalty oath requirement limited to employees with
discretionary authority. Although the Aptheker Court stated that
several factors were relevant to the congressional purpose in restricting travel, it did not state that a legislative standard necessarily must include every one of these factors. In fact, it clearly
avoided this conclusion when it stated that there was no need to
consider the constitutionality of the passport regulation as applied
to the petitioners-both very active high officials of the party-because the petitioners could, in any event, attack the legislation on its
face. 205 Certainly the opinion left open the possibility that Congress
might condition the issuance of passports on most of the factors
mentioned, yet exclude others as not equally significant. Thus,
204 The Court did not mention the obvious administrative difficulties involved
in considering all of these factors. The reference to the federal employees loyalty
program, however, apparently constituted its answer to this problem. Whether
the problems could be handled by an administrative program is uncertain. Could
an administrative hearing determine, for example, whether Aptheker's purpose was
merely to travel and lecture abroad. to visit the Bodleian library, etc.? In any event,
the increase in administrative burden would obviously be great. But this factor
was not considered worthy of discussion.
20 5 See, e.g., 378 U.S. at 514-17. One of the major questions presented in Aptheker
was whether the Court should consider the lack of statutory recognition of such
elements as scienter and active membership when the petitioners themselves clearly met those requirements. This question would have been irrelevant if, for example,
the "purposes and places of travel" were factors that the legislature had to take
into consideration. If that were the case, the statute would clearly be unconstitutional
even as it related to the petitioners. The Court, however, did not rule on the statute
as it applied to the active member, but hdd that the petitioners had standing to
attack the validity of the statute "on its face." Id. at 515.
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it might provide that all knowing members of "communist organizations," would be denied passports to visit the U.S.S.R. or the
"satellite" countries except in connnection with very limited purposes. Whether the Court would reject this provision because
it was not also limited to active members committed to the organization's illicit purposes is not settled by Aptheker. The validity of
a loyalty oath based on knowing membership, but limited in application to a specific group, such as teachers, would present. a
roughly similar question. If Elfbrandt was intended to control m
this situation, then it clearly has proceeded, albeit without discussion, beyond the position taken in Aptheker. This is not to suggest that the general tenor of the opinion in Aptheker might not
furnish some support for such an extension. Certainly the basic
thrust of Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion in Aptheker might be
viewed as indicating that legislation characterizing individuals according to membership will be accepted only when the class of
members is so sharply limited by consideration of all relevant facts
that the tendency ascribed to the group is shown to be an almost
uniform characteristic of each member. 206 Under this premise, of
course, Elf brandt's requirement of "specific intent" is easily sustainable without regard to the limited nature of the positions covered by the oath requirement.
This view of Aptheker would also lend support to the suggestion
in Elfbrandt that an appropriate loyalty oath would require that the
excluded individual be an "active" member of the organization.
Requiring this additional element would mean, in effect, that the
constitutional limits imposed upon an indirect restraint aimed at
preventing improper manipulation of public office would be identical, in the end, with the constitutional limits presently imposed
under Scales on direct restraints on association. 207 Actually, as previously noted, the Elfbrandt opinion at one point suggests that the
constitutional restrictions on the loyalty oath standard might be
taken one step further to require membership with "specific intent"
206 ~cceptance of this view of Aptheker might place the legislature on the horns
of a. dilemma, since legislation limited to such a specific class could present difficulties under the newly expanded concept of "bills of attainder" as presented in
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). See also note 58 supra.
207 See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Noto v. United States,
267 U.S. 290 (1961).
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plus past participation in the organization's unlawful activities. This
proposal reflects the views of Justices Black and Douglas that
"government can concern itself only with the actions of men, not
with their opinions or beliefs." 208 If this position were applied
literally to government employment, the Court would probably
be forced to overrule all the cases cited in the Elfbrandt dissent,
including the Gerende decision in which Justices Black and Douglas joined. 209 Moreover, the standard suggested would obviously
extend beyond the security area and raise a serious question of the
validity of common employment criteria, e.g., personality profiles
that are based in large part upon the individual's general attitudes
and viewpoints. 210 It seems unlikely that the single reference in
Elf brandt to the individual's past participation in illegal action
reflected the willingness of the majority as a whole to take this
step. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan, in particular,
have carefully avoided joining those Black and Douglas dissents
that suggest such a position. 211 The reference in Elf brandt may
reflect a possible change of heart on their part, but similar language
found in Mr. Justice Black's opinion in Schware turned out to have
little consequence. 212
208 Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399, 412, 415 (1958) (Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting); see also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 535-36 (1958) (same).
But cf. DouGLAS, op. cit. supra note 89, at 118-19.
Justices Douglas and Black have on several occasions argued that participation
in the organization's illegal activities should be a prerequisite for employment disqualification. See, e.g., Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 258 (1961); Beilan
v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. at 412-16; Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. at
511. Mr. Justice Douglas also has suggested that such activity is a constitutional
prerequisite for the deportation of aliens. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 56869 (1952) ( dissenting opinion).
2 09

But see DOUGLAS, op. cit. supra note 89, at 130.

210

See generally, Mire!, The Limits of Governmental Inquiry into the Private
Lives of Government Employees, 46 B.U. L. REv. l (1966); Creech, Psychological
Testing and Constitutional Rights, [1966] DuKE L.J. 332.
211 See, e.g., Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399, 411, 417 (1958) (dissenting opinions); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). Mr. Justice Brennan has
been particularly consistent in this regard. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366
U.S. 36, 80 (1961); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 429· (1961); Braden
v. United States, 365 U.S. 431, 446 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109,

166 (1959).
2 12 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 245-46 (1957); Konigsberg
v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 267 (1957).
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VII.

THE STATE'S INTEREST IN PROTECTING INTERNAL SECURITY

The Court's ruling in Elf brandt also constituted a rejection
of the state's interest in preserving internal security as a justification
for the Arizona oath. The problems presented by this aspect of the
Court's decision are basically the same as those discussed in connection with the rejection of the state interest in insuring employ~e
reliability. Here also, the significance of the decision depends m
large part on how the Court viewed the state's interest as presented
in Elf brandt.
The Court has asserted that the state's interest in guarding against
acts injurious to internal security, such as sabotage, espionage_, or
the unintentional release of confidential information, will be given
213
substantial weight in justifying indirect restrictions upon speech.
The difficulty in Elf brandt, once again, was that Arizona's oath
requirement applied to all state employees. The decision in Col~ v.
Young, 214 although not based on constitutional grounds, certainly
indicates that little, if any, weight will be given to the state's alleged
interest in preserving internal security where no effort has been
made to separate the sensitive from the non-sensitive position. The
Court in Cole held that a federal statute authorizing summary discharge of employees "in the interest of national security" 215 could
not properly be applied to all government positions. The dissent
had argued that total coverage was necessary because "one never
knows just which job is sensitive." 216 The majority concluded,
however, that the task of distinguishing between jobs on the basis
of task, access to information, and similar factors was not so difficult as to suppose that Congress meant to include all federal positions under an extraordinary procedure that denied the employee
the normal safeguards of civil service procedures. Certainly, with
First Amendment rights involved, the Court would expect the states
to be equally capable of distinguishing between positions. Accord~ngly, insofar as the state's interest in protecting against subversion
1s concerned, a loyalty restriction encompassing all state employees
might easily be characterized as using "means that broadly stille
213 See, e.g., Communist Party v. S.A.C.B., 367 U.S. 1, 93-96 (1961); Barenblatt
v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 127-29 (1959).
214

351 U.S. 536 (1956).

215 64

Stat. 476, 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1964).

216

3il U.S. at 569.
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fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved."
As previously noted, however, there is little to indicate that the
Court in fact based its decision on the total coverage of the Arizona
oath requirement. On the other hand, as Mr. Justice White emphasized in his dissent, the majority opinion nowhere "expressly holds
that a state must retain, even in its most sensitive positions, those
who lend such support as knowing membership entails to those
organizations, such as the Communist party, whose purposes include the violent destruction of democratic government." 217 The
nature of the test oath is such, however, that it is unlikely to be
used as a primary security device for the "most sensitive position,"
nor, for that matter, is the state government likely to have many
such positions. 218 Nevertheless, a loyalty requirement of the type
employed in Elf brandt might well be imposed for a limited group
of persons, such as state civil defense workers, police officers, and
others who would occupy particularly important positions in time
of emergency. 219 As limited to such positions, a state could defend
a standard excluding all knowing members of organizations urging
violent overthrow on at least two grounds that have considerable
support in practice under state and federal security programs.
First, the state might argue that the importance of its interest in
safeguarding against potential subversion justifies exclusion of all
knowing members as the most effective administrative means of
insuring complete exclusion of these knowing members who do
217

384 U.S. at 20.

218

Loyalty oaths are usually required of general classes of employees, e.g.,
all teachers and civil defense workers. Those state. employees who have access to
classified information will usually constitute only a small group of upper-level
officials within a department, e.g., senior officers within the state militia. These
people will often be subject to federal clearance, and the state is unlikely to
single them out as the subjects for a special loyalty oath.
219 See generally BROWN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 92-109, 2-35-53, 470-71. Various
states presently require civil defense workers to take an oath patterned after the
federal civil defense oath. 64 Stat. 1256, 50 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964). See, e.g., CoNN.
REv. STAT.§ 28-12 (1965 Supp.); ILL. ANN. ST., ch. 127, § 286 (1966 Supp.); Miss REV.
STAT. 38610-18 (1964). A 1965 compilation of state statutes listed thirty states
with special civil defense oaths. FuND FOR THE REPUBLIC, DIGEST OF THE PuBuc
REcoRD OF COMMUNISM 347-82 (1955). Although these oaths vary in context, they
all require a denial of membership in any group that advocates the overthrow of the
government.
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share the organization's illegal objectives. 220 The effectiveness of a
provision like § 5 of the Arizona statute depends upon the deterrence potential of possible criminal prosecution for imprope:ly
subscribing to the state loyalty oath. Yet, while most knowing
members arguably do support the organization's illegal objectives,
proof of "specific intent" as it relates to a particular individual ~ay
often be very difficult. 221 Accordingly, to make the loyalty requirement an effective device, the state must be given administrative
leeway to encompass an area of membership somewhat larger than
that which is the direct source of the supposed evil. Admittedly,
administrative leeway of this sort is not ordinarily accorded in areas
affecting free association, but here, where the statute is appropriately limited to sensitive positions, the impact of the restricrio? o?
association is also limited and the state's need is greater. Any indication in previous cases that only knowing members may be aut~matically excluded even from sensitive positions in no way consntutes a rejection of this position. 222 Failure to require that the member at least be aware of the organization's illegal goals would v~tly
increase the area of associational freedom that would be subject
to restraint. Moreover, the element of knowledge, so the argument
goes, is not nearly so difficult to prove as that of specific intent to
further the organization's illegal purposes. 223
The state may also argue that the exclusion of all knowing members is justified because even the knowing member who does not
share the organization's objective of violent overthrow may present
a threat to internal security. As the Court has recognized on several
occasions, security requirements for sensitive positions extend far
beyond the individual's loyalty to his government. 224 A person who
does not favor violent overthrow of the government but nevertheless joins an organization supporting that objective, either does not
220 See BROWN,
22 1

op. cit. supra note 5, at 235-43, 265.

See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).

222 E.g.,

Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). Wieman, of course, involved

an oath required of all state employees and could be distinguished on that ground.

See Willcox, supra note 129, at 12, 50 n. 158.
223 .See

Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 244-58 (1961). See also Hooit,
GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT RE-

op. cit. supra note 164, at 89;
STRAINTS

135 (1956).

224 See,

e.g., Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers v. McE!roy, 367 U.S. 886, 898-99
(1961); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468,478 (1958); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (19S6).
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consider that organization a serious threat or considers the achievement of other values more important than possibly increasing the
risk of overthrow. In either case, the individual indicates a lack of
appropriate concern for security measures. 225 Similarly, it might
also be argued that anyone who associates with potential subversives
necessarily puts himself in a position where he becomes a more
likely subject of coercive pressure to join a subversive activity. 228
While both these arguments have an Orwellian air about them, the
state could cite experience under the federal loyal security program
to support their use in the case of employees who occupy sensitive
jobs.221
Assuming the Court in Elfbrandt meant to reject all arguments
of this type, the basis for its conclusion, at least as indicated by the
majority opinion, again would rest primarily on Aptheker. The
Aptheker decision seems to be relevant here in much the same
sense as it would be in the situation where the state seeks to insure
against possible misuse of public office by excluding knowing members from positions carrying considerable discretionary authority. 228
The difference in the nature of the interest in safeguarding against
subversion is not likely to be controlling. Aptheker, after all, was
itself presented to the Court as a case involving national security. 229
An argument could be made that the state's security interest is so
greatly sharpened when only sensitive positions are involved that
a policy announced in connection with the general restriction on
travel voided in Aptheker, even if equally applicable to more limited restrictions concerning other state interests, would not be
applicable here. Both past decisions and Elfbrandt itself suggest,
however, that the Elfbrandt majority would not be receptive to
such an argument, if for no other reason than that they would
refuse to attach any special significance to the state interest in safeguarding against subversion by such groups as the police or civil
defense workers.
The Chief Justice, and Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan
225 Cf.

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, IN THE MATIER OF

J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER

(1954). See HooK, op. cit. supra note 164, at 225.

226 See BROWN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 254-61, 272;
note 162, at 70-72.
227 See BROWN, op. cit. supra note
22s See text at notes 204--07 supra.

SELZNICK,

5, at 37, 254-79.

229 378 U.S. at 509.

op. cit. supra
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all have indicated that they draw an important distinction between
government positions classified as "sensitive" because of special access to confidential information and those placed in that category
simply because of their potential significance during a period of
national emergency. In fact, for Justices Black and Douglas, t~e
state's interest in protecting against subYersion by employees m
the latter situation will rank no higher than its interest generally
in preventing other types of misuse of position. Thus, in Lerner v.
Casey,230 Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent, joined by Mr. Justice Black,
clearly gave no special weight to the fact that the employee, a New
York subway conductor, was classified as working in a "sensitive"
position under the New York Risk Law. Mr. Justice Douglas
treated the question of the state's power to discharge the conduct?r
on the basis of his speech or association as no different from its
power to discharge the teacher involved in a companion case from
Pennsylvania.231 In response to the state's argument that the co_nductor's access to an important transportation facility placed him
in an especially sensitive position, Mr. Justice Douglas quoted a
lower court opinion noting that vast numbers of persons throughout the economy had access to prime sites for sabotage, that the
imposition of restrictive security regulations on all such persons
would be constitutionally impermissible, and therefore "in the event
of war" we may just have to take our chances with the possibility
of "Black Torn explosions on every waterfront, poison in our water
systems, and sand in all important industrial rnachines." 232 Mr. Justice Douglas has recognized, on the other hand, that special considerations may require more flexibility in permitting the discharge of
persons who have access to classified information or restricted
locations. 233 Mr. Justice Brennan, along with the Chief Justice, also
230

357 U.S. 468 (1958).

231

357 U.S. at 415-16.

232

11· at 416-17, quoting Judge Pope in

Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708, 721
{9th Cir. 1955). See also Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 US. 292, 300, 303-04
(1956) (dissenting opinion) •
• 2 ~3 See ~oUGLAS, THE RIGHT To BE LET ALONE 118, 121 (1958). Although recogn~mg the importance of the security interest in this situation, Mr. Justice Douglas
still opposes any type of administrative program that might involve "labeling."
He would prefer that the executive in charge have absolute discretion to discharge
men and women in "sensitive jobs for good reasons or for no reasons at all."
Id. at 121. E~actl~ what wo~ld happen to the normal civil service protection
of employees m this category 1s not stated, but the loss of that safeguard is apparently deemed to be the lesser of two evils.
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has recognized this distinction, although it is not clear that they
would go quite so far as Mr. Justice Douglas in their treatment of
the fact that a particular government position provides the potential to cause substantial harm in an emergency situation.284 While
the remainder of the Court has not spoken to this point, it seems
likely that at least l\fr. Justice Fortas, who was in the majority in
Elf brandt, would also be reluctant to attach any substantial weight
to the state's interest in preventing subversion as it related to jobs
with particular security significance only under the "remote risk
of a mass breakdown." 235

VIII.

THE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ELFBRANDT AND THE
FUTURE OF LOYALTY OATHS

In terms of the legal limits upon loyalty oaths, the ultimate
significance of Elf brandt will depend upon how the Court answers
various questions left unanswered by Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion:
whether the Garner case has been overruled; whether the Court
has rejected the state's interest in denying support to "disloyal"
persons as an appropriate basis for a test oath; whether the addition
of an element of "specific intent to further the illegal aims of the
organization" would be required in an oath limited in application
to employees in positions that could easily be manipulated to serve
organizational ends; whether the same would be true of an oath
applicable only to employees in positions classified as "sensitive"
from the standpoint of protecting internal security; and, finally,
whether, wherever the specific intent element must be added, the
Court will also insist upon a requirement of active participation in
the organization's affairs, or even participation in illegal activities.
On the other hand, in terms of its practical significance, the impact
of Elf brandt will be much the same whether these questions are
answered in one way or in another.
Obviously, many oaths, no matter what view of Elfbrandt is
taken, will survive litigation, at least temporarily. State courts,
taking a page from the Scales case, 236 may "read into" the mem234

Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468,417, 421-22 (1958).

235 BROWN,

op. cit. supra note 5, at 248.

367 U.S. 203 (1961). The Court there interpreted the Smith Act membership
clause to require both "active" membership and "specific intent" to support violent overthrow, although neither element was mentioned in the statute. State courts
have followed this pattern in the past with respect to the element of scienter.
See Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485,494 n. 8 (1952),
236
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bership clause of state oaths the requirements of specific intent
and perhaps even active membership. In other instances, while the
membership clause may be held unconstitutional, the state court
will retain as properly severable that clause dealing with the individual's own advocacy of overthrow. 237 Even where the entire oath
is voided, the likelihood is that the legislature will swiftly re-enact
it in appropriately modified form. For the combination of cold
war exasperation, fear, and chauvinism that produces community
support for loyalty tests apparently is still present in most par~
of the country. While Congress was repealing the loyalty affidavit
requirements of the Defense Education Act and Economic Opportunity Act, 238 it was adopting a new loyalty requirement in the
Medicare Act,239 and the Office of Economic Opportunity was
240
adding still another loyalty requirement for antipoverty workers:
Similarly, on the state level, organized efforts to gain legislative
repeal of oaths have been noticeably unsuccessful.2 41
It is equally clear that the ardent opposition to the oaths will be
only slightly mollified, if at all, by the addition to the oaths of such
requirements as the member's "specific intent" to support the organization's illegal objectives. In the past that opposition has gone
primarily to the basic concept of the loyalty oath, rather tha_n t_o
the specific standards employed in the oaths. 242 Resentment of mdividuals at being singled out as government employees or teachers
to swear to such oaths will remain. 243 As for those employees whose
associations might have been determined in part by the fear of a
possible prosecution or loss of job, the addition of the elements of
"specific intent" and "active membership" is unlikely to provide
great comfort-especially when the Court itself warns that both
prosecutors and juries are only "human" and may therefore have a
237

Cf. Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 137 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1962).

238

76 Stat. 1070 (1962); 79 Stat. 973 (1961). See N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1962, P· 13,
col. 3; N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1962, p. 1, col. 2.
239 79 Stat. 333, 42 U .S.C. § 427 (note). See note 160 supra. This requirement has
been implemented by the use of an oath.
240 ACLU,
2 41

Feature Press Service Bulletin, § 2265, May 9, 1966.

See note 4 supra.

242 See Byse, A Report on the Pennsylvania Loyalty Act 101 U. PA. L. REv. 480,
486 (1953).
'
243

See N.Y. Times, March 11, 1966, p. 9, cols. 3, 4.
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tendency to "label as Communist [any] ideas which they oppose." 244
In light of these facts, it is not surprising that current legal attacks against loyalty oaths frequently are concentrated not on
standards used in the oaths, but on the alleged invalidity of any
and all loyalty oaths, no matter what standards they employ. 246
The main argument being advanced is that, assuming the state may
utilize some form of loyalty test based upon certain classes of speech
and association to serve the legitimate interests of protecting internal
security and insuring employee reliability, the loyalty oath is invalid because it is a totally inappropriate means of serving those
interests. Thus, the petitioner in Elfbrandt based his argument in
part on the alleged ineffectiveness of loyalty oaths in keeping undesirable persons out of government employment. 246 In support of
this position, petitioner cited several commentators who have noted
that oaths have been most ineffective in disclosing potential subversives. 247 The only employees who have objected to newly imposed oaths have been those with conscientious objections to the
oath. On the other hand, "the really dangerous 'Reds,' the unidentified plotters, are unlikely to stickle at taking the oaths." 248
Mr. Justice Douglas took a similar extrajudicial view of the loyalty oath. 249 And the Elfbrandt opinion quotes an Arizona legislative report that notes the ineffectiveness of oaths against "the
Communist trained in fraud and perjury." 250 The report appears
to have been used to make another point, 251 however, and it seems
unlikely that the Court as a whole would be willing to base its
judgment in any large degree upon the alleged ineffectiveness of the
244 384 U.S. at 16--17. See also Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 509
(1952).
245

See note 4 supra.

246

Brief for Petitioner, 6, 27-28.

24 7

Jd. at 28, citing Horowitz, supra note 93; Byse, supra note 242; Elson, People,
Government and Security, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 83 (1956); O'Brian, New Encroachments on Individual Freedom, 66 HARV. L. REv.1 (1952).
2 4 s GELLHORN, op. cit. supra note 223, at 367--68, quoted in Byse, supra note 242,
at 485.
249

DouGLAs, op. cit., supra note 89, at 135-36.

250 384 U.S. at 18, quoting from the report of the Arizona Judiciary Committee,
Journal of the Senate, 1st Reg. Sess., 25th Legislature of Arizona 424 (1961).
2 51 The remainder of the quotation dealt with the impact of the oath upon
public employees generally, and the report was cited to emphasize Mr. Justice
Douglas' argument on that point. See 384 U.S. at 17-18.
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oaths. Since the effectiveness of the oaths depends in large degree
252
upon the fear of a possible prosecution for false swearing, any
attempt to evaluate its operation is necessarily speculative. Individuals who openly refuse to take the oath afford no basis for judgment.253 The active member of an organization who might potentially misuse his office or even engage in subversion to assist the
organization is not likely to announce that he is leaving government employment because he fears a possible criminal prosecution
for false swearing. In the end, the effectiveness of the loyalty oath
in forcing such persons out of government remains in large part a
matter of conjecture. 254
A more substantial argument supporting the rejection of all oaths
could be based on the rationale of Aptheker and Elfbrandt, that
the oath constitutes an unnecessarily restrictive means of accomplishing the state's objectives. First, it might be argued that the
only legitimate objective of a loyalty oath is the exclusion of persons who might engage in undesirable conduct as an employee.
This would require that the Court expand upon the theme of
Speiser and find that the denial of employment for reasons unr~lated to the employee's prospective performance in office constitutes punishment and cannot be imposed without the procedural
guarantees afforded by the Sixth Amendment. 255 With this point
established, it could be argued that the loyalty oath constituted an
unnecessarily broad and rigid means of judging the employee's potential performance. The determination that an individual is likely
to misuse his public position in order to aid a subversive organization
or to engage in subversion cannot rest on the automatic application
of any set criterion. Several factors, it could be argued, must be
considered, and each is a variable that must be viewed in the light
of the others. Even, for example, the individual's commitment to
252 A substantial number of prosecutions for false swearing were brought on the
basis of the Taft-Hartley loyalty oath sustained in American Communications Ass'n
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). See I EMERSON & HABER, PoLITICAL AND CIVIL
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 472 (1954). At least one criminal prosecution relating
back to the Taft-Hartley oath is still pending. See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S.
855 (1966).

253 On the oth~r hand, it is relevant in determining the impact of the restriction
on the free exercise of the right of association. See Byse, supra note 242, at 484-85.
254 See BROWN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 94-95.
25 5 See text at notes 138-52 supra.
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the illegal goals of an organization and his active membership in
the organization cannot be treated as sufficient. The state must also
examine the nature of the position involved, the employee's past
attitude toward his work, and the nature of the "subversive" organization to which he belongs. All of these are factors that must be
considered and weighed on an individual basis. The oath is not
sufficiently flexible to permit this and, as a result, may easily exclude a person who, upon consideration of all the relevant factors,
would be found not to present a potential for either direct subversion or misuse of office. Accordingly, the argument would conclude, the loyalty oath constitutes a means of achieving a legitimate
state end that "broadly stifle[s] fundamental personal rights when
the end can be more narrowly achieved." 256
Support for this argument could come from both Aptheker and
Elf brandt in so far as both cases suggest that multiple factors must
be considered in administrating an employment standard related to
speech or association. Aptheker also lends some support for the
position that these factors cannot be weighted automatically by a
loyalty oath. In striking down a statutory prohibition against the
issuance of passports to members of "communist organizations,"
the Court in Aptheker specifically pointed to the Federal Employee
Loyalty program as an analogous illustration of a "less drastic"
means of achieving the congressional purpose of safeguarding national security. 257 The same federal program illustrates that here also
the state's interests "can be adequately protected by means which,
when compared with [the loyalty oath] are more discriminately
tailored to the constitutional liberties of the individual." 258
Although this position may indeed find a fair degree of support
in Aptheker and Elf brandt, its acceptance by the Court would be
most unfortunate. It would ignore the fact that the rule prohibiting
a state from using means that "broadly stifle fundamental rights
when the end can be more narrowly achieved" represents a judicial,
not a legislative, standard, and it is to be applied within the limits
of the judicial function in reviewing legislation. As noted by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter: 259
256Shelton v. Tucker, 362 U.S. 479,488 (1961).
257

358 U.S. at 512-14.

258

/d. at 514.

259

364 U.S. at 493-94.
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The consideration of feasible alternative modes of regulation
... [does] not imply that the Court might substitute its own
choice among alternatives for that of a state legislature or that
the states ... [are] to be restricted to the narrowest workable
means of accomplishing an end .... The issue remains w~e;her,
in light of the particular kind of restriction upon ind1v1~ual
liberty which a regulation entails, it is reasonable for a legislature to choose that form of regulation rather than others less
restrictive. To that determination, the range of judgments easily open to a legislature in considering the relative degrees ~f
efficiency of alternative means in achieving the end it seeks 1s
pertinent.
The argument for total rejection of loyalty oaths simply fails to
give weight to these pertinent factors. To suggest that the loyalty
oath is unconstitutional because a loyalty program will provide less
rigid standards and, therefore, will reach more appropriate results
in an individual case is to ignore all considerations of cost, of administrative ease, 260 and perhaps even of the over-all impact on society in its exercise of associational rights. For one can easily argue
that a loyalty program has a far greater restrictive impact on
speech than does the loyalty oath. Admittedly, the program offers
the individual a chance to explain his position, and therefore should
produce a decision in which the individual would have more confidence. But loyalty programs also permit broad-ranging investigations of an individual's beliefs and background, involve considerably
more delay and expense to the individual, and offer far greater
opportunity for serious injury to his reputation. 261 In any event,
irrespective of which type of regulation in fact constitutes a more
serious deterrent to the exercise of individual rights, this hardly
seems to be the type of judgment that the Court can adequately or
appropriately make.
The relative merits or demerits of the loyalty oath and loyalty
program point up the practical limits of a decision that would go
so far as to find all loyalty oaths invalid. As noted, the public concern over security and loyalty matters still runs strong. The rejec260 The costs of administration here are obviously far more substantial than in

Shelton. See KAr.vEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 103-05 (1965). See also
Karst, supra note 125, at 15-18; BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 113-17
(1962).

~ 6 ~ See A?ler ~- Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 508 (1952) (dissenting
Optruon); V1tarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 5~5 (1959); BROWN, op. cit. s:upra
note 5, at 21-61, 183-201, 235-83. But see Green, Q-Clearance: The Development
of a Personnel Security Program, 20 Buu. ATOMIC ScIENTISTS 9 (1964).
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tion of loyalty oaths might only produce a new series of loyalty programs. The Court has directly considered the constitutionality of a loyalty program only in Adler,262 and even then it
scrutinized only a part of the program. Nevertheless, the nature of
the response by both majority and dissent to earlier cases involving
the federal program indicates that with appropriate procedure and
labels an administrative loyalty program limited in application to
special groups of employees will be sustained. 263 Admittedly, administrative programs cost more to administer than loyalty oaths and
consequently will not be used as extensively. 264 Yet it seems likely
also that loyalty programs will be used in connection with those
positions, such as public school teachers, where the programs can
do the greatest damage to the spirit of free inquiry. In the end,
looking to the impact on free association throughout the society,
one must wonder which is the lesser evil. It must be recognized,
however, that the loyalty oath and loyalty program can be, and
sometimes are, cumulative and not alternative devices. In this light,
a prohibition against oaths might well appeal to the Court as affording some diminution of the total restriction that may be imposed
upon speech by loyalty measures.
IX.

CONCLUSION: THE ELFBRANDT OPINION

At last, a few comments should be made concerning the
Elf hrandt opinion, not as it reflects upon the future of loyalty

oaths, but simply as it reflects on the art of opinion writing as practiced in the Supreme Court. If one were asked to pick that opinion
in the 1966 Term that best lends support to the recent criticism
of the Court's opinions,265 there is no doubt that Elf brandt would
262

Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).

263

See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 539
( 1959); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 ( 195 5). While Justices Black and Douglas have
not hesitated in other cases to go beyond the procedural issue presented and find the
entire state or federal program invalid, see, e.g., Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524,
568 (1952); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468, 512 (1958), they have not suggested here
that the entire federal program is invalid. Mr. Justice Brennan and the Chief Justice
clearly have been willing to assume that a program would be valid provided the
proper procedures were followed and employees were not categorized as disloyal.
See Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399,417,422 (1958).
2 6 4 The New York experience shows, however, that they are hardly so expensive
as to be out of the state's reach. See also Horowitz, supra note 93.

265 See

Shapiro, supra note 47, at 591 (collecting sources); Kurland, supra note 68,

at 144-45.
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rank at least among the quarter finalists. Certainly this is an opinion
that ignores past precedent, that fails to define carefully the interests involved in the case, and that fails even to attempt to rebut
the arguments of its opponents. Perhaps these features are a product
of compromise among five Justices who could not agree, for exam·
ple, on just how Garner should be handled and therefore decided
that the best treatment was silence. Yet it seems likely from comparison with other opinions that Elf brandt was less the product of
compromise than the product of Mr. Justice Douglas' general approach to the writing of opinions. That approach, a reflection of
what has been described as Mr. Justice "Douglas's relentless effort
to simplify our understanding of the world," 266 is rather nicely analyzed by Yosal Rogat as follows: 267
As presented by Justice Douglas, not a single case is hard
enough to perplex a right thinking man; a case does not present
a tangle of competing principles, but a single transcendent
principle-for instance, free speech or religious freedomwhich need on1y be identified for the solution to be plain. In
this way, he avoids the task, so basic to legal analysis, of reconciling competing principles. Instead, he substitutes simple labels
and lines....

Obviously opinions of this type will hardly qualify Mr. Justice
Douglas for membership in Holmes's Society of Jobbists,268 a position to which Mr. Justice Douglas undoubtedly does not aspire. 269
Still, opinions like Elfbrandt seemingly also would leave a good
deal to be desired for those who, like Mr. Justice Douglas, are interested in "results," not craftsmanship. Opinions that fail to resolve
the competing issues, that ignore precedent and speak in generalities, are also opinions that are easy to distinguish. They provide
stepping stones for moving backward or sideward as well as forward. Such opinions constitute "the law" for only so long as their
author has the ready votes. To some degree this is always true,
but Mr. Justice Douglas to the contrary notwithstanding, the weight
of precedent does have a significant effect even in the area of
constitutional law. To have such effect, however, an opinion should
at least explore fully the issues before the Court and clearly and
carefully resolve them.
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